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In their charging and bargaining decisions, prosecutors have unparalleled
and nearly-unchecked discretion that leads to incarceration or freedom for
millions of Americans each year. More than courts, legislators, or any other
justice system player, in the aggregate prosecutors’ choices are the key drivers
of outcomes, whether the rates of mass incarceration or the degree of racial
disparities in justice. To date, there is precious little empirical research on how
prosecutors exercise their breathtaking discretion. We do not know whether they
consistently charge like cases alike or whether crime is in the eye of the
beholder. We do not know what sorts of limits, supervision, or guidelines
prosecutors work within. And we do not know what sorts of information
prosecutors rely upon, when making their decisions. Prosecutors’ decisions
have accordingly been called a “black box” for their inscrutability.
Until now. We recruited over 500 prosecutors nationwide, and had them
charge an identical case given identical substantive law, specify the plea
bargain terms that they would seek, and explain their decisions. We also learned
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BLACK BOX OF PROSECUTOR DISCRETION
about their internal office guidelines and procedures, and the information they
rely upon when making charging and bargaining decisions.
Our study tells a story of surprising severity in how prosecutors dispose of
a relatively mild case with no harm to victims, creating potentially devastating
consequences for an offender suffering from apparent mental illness. Taking
advantage of our vignette-survey design, which presents the exact same case to
hundreds of prosecutors, we also document wild heterogeneity in prosecutor
charging practices, with some dismissing the case out of hand and others
demanding months or years of incarceration. We also find that many
prosecutors lack meaningful guidelines or supervision. Nonetheless, in our
review of their qualitative explanations, we also find prosecutors aspiring to do
justice, concerned about harm to victims and the rehabilitation of offenders, and
considering their mental health and financial wherewithal. From these findings,
we shed light in an otherwise theoretically rich but empirically lacking area of
criminal scholarship.
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Prosecutors have extensive power and what guides their decisions is largely unknown
and inscrutable.1 There is an ongoing national conversation about the role of prosecutors
in increasing and potentially reducing national incarceration rates,2 as well as their role in
contributing to incarceration disparities that harm people of color.3 Some scholars have
focused on the rise of newly-elected prosecutors articulating progressive visions,4
intimating that progressive scholarship has swept a wave over the nation.5 However, it is
unclear whether isolated progressive statements from head prosecutors translate into
meaningful leniency from line prosecutors. Indeed, prosecutor decision making, including
what factors they consider in charging and plea bargaining, has been referred to as the
“black box.”6 This is protected information that is not discoverable by defendants and has

1

Chad Flanders & Stephen Galoob, Progressive Prosecution in a Pandemic, 110 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 685, 690 (2020) (“[T]he power and discretion of prosecutors . . . could be wielded
either for harsh justice or for mercy and leniency.”); Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutors and Their State
and Local Polities, 110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 823, 825 (2020) (“[A] prosecutor’s declination
policy is a matter of debate with the prosecutor’s office, among other lawyers, and with the larger
voting public.”).
2
Jeffrey Bellin, Expanding the Reach of Progressive Prosecution, 110 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 707 (2020) (describing how societal pressures have lead to the rise of progressive
prosecutors to address the failings of mass incarceration and recidivism).
3
Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, When Prosecutors Politick: Progressive Law Enforcers
Then and Now, 110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 719, 752 (2020) (noting that progressive
prosecutors “attempt to minimize racial and economic injustice, exemplified by high rates of
incarceration, particularly of poor people and minorities.”).
4
See, e.g., Bellin, supra note 2 at 707–11; Flanders & Galoob, supra note 1 at 688–94; see
also Rachel E. Barkow, Can Prosecutors Help To End Mass Incarceration?, __ MICH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 9) (highlighting that progressive prosecutors face challenges to
getting elected, even in urban, liberal areas).
5
Kim Foxx was elected State’s Attorney for Cook County, Illinois (Chicago) in 2016; Larry
Krasner was elected District Attorney of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in 2017; Rachael Rollins was
elected District Attorney of Suffolk County, Massachusetts (Boston) in 2018. See Caren Morrison,
Progressive Prosecutor’s Scored Big Wins in 2020 Elections, Boosting a Nationwide Trend, THE
CONVERSATION,
https://theconversation.com/progressive-prosecutors-scored-big-wins-in-2020elections-boosting-a-nationwide-trend-149322; see also Cara Bayles, A New Class of Prosecutors:
Reformers Win Races Nationwide, LAW 360 (Nov. 8, 2020, 8:02 PM EST),
https://www.law360.com/access-to-justice/articles/1326594/a-new-class-of-prosecutors-reformerswin-races-nationwide (“Progressive newcomers were elected to top prosecutor posts in Los
Angeles; Austin, Texas; Orlando, Florida; Detroit; Aurora, Colorado; and Columbus, Ohio; as well
as what were considered local presidential battlegrounds, like Michigan’s Oakland County, a suburb
of Detroit.”).
6
Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 129 (2008) (“[T]he
black box: the inner workings of prosecutors’ offices. . . . [T]he absence of controlling statutes or
case law makes it possible for prosecutors to do their daily work without explaining their choices to
the public.”).
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been difficult to examine empirically.7
Prosecutors play a key role in the administration of criminal justice.8 Prosecutors
decide whether to initiate criminal proceedings,9 what charges to bring,10 what penalties to
seek,11 and whether to agree to a plea bargain,12 and what sentencing recommendations to
advise.13 The prosecutor may be the government official with the most unreviewable power
and discretion.14 Since the vast majority of cases are resolved short of trial, a second key
7

Shima Baradaran Baughman & Megan S. Wright, Prosecutors and Mass Incarceration, __S.
CALIF. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 27–36) (noting the lack of up-to-date empirical
research on prosecutorial decisions).
8
See Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 717,
773 (1996); George C. Thomas, Discretion and Criminal Law: The Good, the Bad, and the
Mundane, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1043, 1043 (2005); Brandon K. Crase, When Doing Justice Isn’t
Enough: Reinventing the Guidelines for Prosecutorial Discretion, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 475,
475 (2007); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARVARD L. REV. 1521,
1521 (1981).
9
See generally Sarah Ribstein, A Question of Costs: Considering Pressure on White-Collar
Criminal Defendants, 58 DUKE L.J. 857, 868 (2009); Samuel J. Levine, The Potential Utility of
Disciplinary Regulation as a Remedy for Abuses of Prosecutorial Discretion, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L.
& PUB. POL’Y 1, 4 (2017); Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable
Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1700 (2010).
10
See generally Wesley MacNeil Oliver & Rishi Batra, Standards of Legitimacy in Criminal
Negotiations, 20 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 61, 67 (2015); Craig H. Solomon, Prosecutorial
Vindictiveness: Divergent Lower Court Applications of the Due Process Prohibition, 50 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 324, 324 (1982); Kyle Graham, Overcharging, 11 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 701, 710
(2014); Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution, 86 WASH. L. REV. 69, 84 (2011).
11
See generally Carrie Leonetti, When the Emperor Has No Clothes III: Personnel Policies
and Conflicts of Interest in Prosecutors’ Offices, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 53, 53 (2012);
Peter L. Markowitz, Prosecutorial Discretion Power at Its Zenith: The Power to Protect Liberty, 97
B.U. L. REV. 489, 490 (2017).
12
See generally Cynthia Alkon, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Failure to Fix Plea Bargaining:
The Impact of Lafler and Frye, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 561, 599 (2014); Jeffrey Standen, Plea
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1471, 1472 (1993); Ronald Wright
& Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 33 (2002); Michael M.
O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GEO. L. REV. 407, 420–25 (2008).
13
See generally Nicole T. Amsler, Leveling the Playing Field: Applying Federal Corporate
Charging Considerations to Individuals, 66 DUKE L.J. 169, 173 (2016); Shima Baradaran
Baughman, Subconstitutional Checks, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1071, 1091 (2017); Kate Stith, The
Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420,
1470 (2008); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial Assistance, and the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. REV. 105, 107 (1994); O’Hear, supra note 12; Geoffrey
S. Corn & Adam M. Gershowitz, Imputed Liability for Supervising Prosecutors: Applying the
Military Doctrine of Command Responsibility to Reduce Prosecutorial Misconduct, 14 BERKELEY
J. CRIM. L. 395, 399 (2009); Vorenberg, supra note 9; Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions
as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1010, 1011 (2005).
14
Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA.
L. REV. 959, 959 (2009); Erwin Chemerinsky, Eliminating Discrimination in Administering the
Death Penalty: The Need for the Racial Justice Act. 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 35 (1994).
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point of attention is plea bargaining, which is also controlled by prosecutors.
Prosecutors’ wide discretion creates opportunity for racial and gender bias,15
overcharging,16 vindictiveness,17 plea bargaining abuses,18 and wrongful convictions.19
However, prosecutorial discretion allows prosecutors to adapt to different scenarios
involving unique facts and defendants and provides a way for prosecutors to manage their
ever-growing caseloads through plea-bargaining.20 Arguably, prosecutorial discretion puts
decision making in the hands of those with institutional knowledge of the criminal justice
system. As the Supreme Court has explained, “because discretion is essential to the
criminal justice process, we would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer
that the discretion has been abused.”21

15

Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive
Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1590 (2006); see State v. Monday, 257 P.3d 551, 556
(Wash. 2011) (“Prosecutor Konat injected racial prejudice into the trial proceedings by asserting
that black witnesses are unreliable.”); see also United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 774 (1st Cir.
1995) (“[C]ourts must not tolerate prosecutors’ efforts gratuitously to inject issues like race and
ethnicity into criminal trials.”); Andrew E. Taslitz, Judging Jena’s D.A.: The Prosecutor and Racial
Esteem, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 420 (2009) (arguing that “racially-skewed outcomes . . .
cannot occur without prosecutorial support”); The Mo. Task Force on Gend. & Justice, Report of
the Missouri Task Force on Gender and Justice, 58 MO. L. REV. 485, 506 (1993) (explaining that
prosecutors may assign low priority to domestic violence cases because they lack understanding,
sensitivity, and may not believe female victims).
16
Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 140
(1968); see also Wright & Miller, supra note 12 at 32 (arguing for a hard screening system to prevent
prosecutorial overcharging); H. Mitchell Caldwell, Coercive Plea Bargaining: The Unrecognized
Scourge of the Justice System, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 63, 72 (2011) (applying game theory to
overcharging).
17
See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978); United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368
(1982).
18
See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 40 (1970) (threat of death penalty to force
defendant to plead guilty to lesser murder charge not coercive); United States v. Speed Joyeros, 204
F. Supp. 2d 412, 444 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (extended pre-trial incarceration caused defendant’s physical
and mental health to deteriorate, but plea bargain acceptable despite the danger of due process
violations by the intensive pressure on defendant to plead guilty).
19
See generally Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and
Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies for A Broken System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 399, 403 (2006)
(discussing one study showing that, out of 62 persons exonerated by DNA evidence, prosecutorial
misconduct played a role in 26 of those wrongful convictions); see also Baughman, supra note 13
at 1110–11; Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in
Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 291 (2006).
20
George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 865 (2000) (arguing that a
crushing workload and increased caseloads explain why prosecutors began to choose to plea bargain
and why they continue to do so today).
21
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 280 (1987).
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Nonetheless, many legal scholars argue that the unchecked power of prosecutorial
discretion is too broad.22 Legal commentators have characterized prosecutorial discretion
as a “dangerous”23 and “tyrannical”24 decision-making process because it is “unreviewed
and its justifications are unarticulated.”25 Others have claimed that prosecutorial discretion
is the single largest cause of mass incarceration and is responsible for the expansive growth
in felony convictions since the 1970s.26
One troubling aspect of unbridled prosecutorial discretion is that it renders
inconsistent results with defendants receiving widely varying treatment for similar

22

Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 869 (2009) (“There are currently no effective legal
checks in place. . . . In a government whose hallmark is supposed to be the separation of powers,
federal prosecutors are a glaring and dangerous exception.”); Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of
Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1049 (2006) (similar); Stephen B. Bright &
Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance After Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J.
2150, 2150 (2013) (“The U.S. criminal system is not truly adversarial because prosecutors possess
broad, unchecked power and therefore determine results in criminal cases with little or no input
from the defense.”); Hon. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, In Defense of American Criminal Justice, 67
VAND. L. REV. 1099, 1130 (2014) (“[U]unfettered prosecutorial discretion and the ‘relative absence
of efforts to standardize and regulate charging practices’ lead to arbitrary charging decisions, often
with an outsized impact on minorities and the poor.”); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 295 (2011) (“[P]rosecutorial power is unchecked by law and, given
its invisibility, barely checked by politics.”).
23
Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 5 (1940); see
also Bennett L Gerhman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 408–09 (1992)
(“Uncontrolled discretion . . . has the potential for abuse. In the hands of prosecutors, this potential
is now a reality.”).
24
Henderson v. United States, 349 F.2d 712, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting);
see also Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of
Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 399 (2001) (noting that “[t]he current constitutional design is
dysfunctional as a check on prosecutorial power.”).
25
Robert L. Rabin, Agency Criminal Referrals in the Federal System: An Empirical Study of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1036, 1073 (1972); Leonetti, supra note 11 at 55
(“[U]nreviewed prosecutorial discretion makes a nasty cocktail when mixed with invidious forms
of prosecutorial conduct.”).
26
Barkow, supra note 4 (manuscript at 24) (“Mass incarceration is driven by two factors: the
number of cases coming into the system (admissions) and the length of sentences. Prosecutors have
discretion to change the rate of admissions and for cases going forward, they can also influence
sentences based on the charges they bring and the sentences they request (or accept in pleas).”);
John F. Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth, 28 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 1239, 1240
(2012) (concluding that prosecutors are the “who” behind prison growth in the United States due to
number of felony filings per arrest); JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS
INCARCERATION AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (2017) (“Recall that over the 1990s and
2000s . . . even as the number of arrests declined the number of felony cases filed in state courts
rose sharply. In the end, the probability that a prosecutor would file felony charges against and
arrestee basically doubled, and that change pushed prison populations up even as crime dropped.”).
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crimes.27 As a result, the public is unsure if the prosecutor has a reasonable explanation for
the apparent inconsistent decision or if she is abusing her power or demonstrating bias.28
Questions about the consistency and fairness of prosecutorial decisions motivates this
study.
There is currently no field experimental evidence comparing how prosecutors
nationally charge a case with similar facts. While this evidence does not yet exist, this
Article provides the next best thing: insight into how prosecutors wish they could charge a
case. It also provides insight into what limits a prosecutor in charging, what guidelines they
are required to follow, and what prosecutors claim they consider when charging a case.
This Article explores prosecutors’ discretion, specifically their discretion in the initial
charging decision. The first point of contact with a prosecutor is the decision to charge a
defendant with a crime. Prosecutor discretion in the charging decision is important to study
because it may reduce the efficacy of downstream policy reforms, such as sentencing
guidelines, which have been enacted to reduce disparities in outcomes.29
In this Article, we present results from an original empirical study of prosecutor
decision making in order to better understand the “black box” of prosecutor discretion. We
surveyed hundreds of prosecutors about how they make charging decisions, and we also
presented them with a hypothetical case and asked for their charging and punishment
recommendations. Our results demonstrate significant variability in prosecutor decision
making, especially by geographic region, perhaps because many of our respondents work
in offices that do not have internal guidelines or standards that constrain discretion. Our
results also illuminate the process of prosecutor decision making, including factors they
claim are important to their decision.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews prior research on prosecutor decision
making, including variability in charging, severity in charging, national and local guidance,
and the factors that prosecutors rely upon in making decisions. Part II describes our
empirical approach, including the methods for recruiting prosecutors, collecting data, and
analyzing the data. Part III lays out our findings, including the heterogeneity in charges
and penalties assessed, the prosecutors’ reasons for their decisions, the use of guidelines or
standards, and the information they rely upon. Part IV provides a discussion, identifying
directions for reform and for further research.

27

Bibas, supra note 14, at 978; Vorenberg, supra note 9 at 1537; Anne Bowen Poulin,
Prosecutorial Inconsistency, Estoppel, and Due Process: Making the Prosecution Get Its Story
Straight, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1423, 1423 (2001).
28
Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 911, 945–46 (2006).
29
Rachel E. Barkow, Sentencing Guidelines at the Crossroads of Politics and Expertise, 160
U. PA. L. REV. 1599, 1602 (2012) (“[Sentencing] commissions could and should do more to address
the relationship between guidelines and prosecutorial power . . . . [b]ecause some amount of
prosecutorial discretion is necessary and inevitable.”); see also Kate Stith & Karen Dunn, A Second
Chance for Sentencing Reform: Establishing a Sentencing Agency in the Judicial Branch, 58 STAN.
L. REV. 217, 221 (2005); Russell D. Covey, Rules, Standards, Sentencing, and the Nature of Law,
104 CAL. L. REV. 447, 483 (2016).
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I. REVIEW OF PRIOR RESEARCH ON PROSECUTOR DECISIONMAKING
While fairness and justice critiques of prosecutors are plentiful,30 there has not been a
focus in the scholarship on the variability of prosecutor charging or concerns about severity
of charging by prosecutors. One of the reasons for this is because we lack national data on
how prosecutors’ charging varies across the country. While individual prosecutors have
been critiqued for severity,31 there has not been national evidence to study whether
prosecutors as a group are charging appropriately. This Part reviews the literature on
variability and severity in prosecutor charging decisions and sentencing recommendations.
It then explains the constraints on prosecutor discretion, namely the role of professional or
office level guidelines. And finally, it reviews the literature discussing the factors relevant
to prosecutors’ decisions.
A. Variability in Prosecutor Charging
There are few explicit bars to prosecutor variability in charging, including from the
Constitution, statutes or national prosecutor bodies. Some scholars have even argued that
consistency across prosecutorial decisions should not be the goal; rather, we should strive
towards a system where there are “roughly equivalent probabilities of receiving some
favorable result.”32 As compared to criminal justice systems in Europe, uniformity is a less
articulated priority in the U.S. criminal justice system.33 However there are some
articulated standards warning against variability in prosecutor charging. The Constitution
limits variability on prosecutor charging only where concerns of race, religion or another
arbitrary classification are raised.34 The American Bar Association (ABA) cautions against
“unwarranted disparate treatment of similarly situated persons,” but does so by listing it as
only one of many factors to be considered in any case.35 Likewise, the commentary to the
30

See Bibas supra note 14 (“The deeper problem is that systemic patterns of charging and plea
bargaining, influenced by self-interest, bias, and other considerations, may undercut equality and
equity.”); Vorenberg supra note 9 (“[P]rosecutors' actions can determine who gets twenty years and
who gets a year or two or probation for essentially the same conduct.”); Leonetti, supra note 11
(“[U]nreviewed prosecutorial discretion makes a nasty cocktail when mixed with invidious forms
of prosecutorial conduct.”).
31
See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, Prosecutors Draw Fire for Sentences Called Harsh, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 5, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/06/us/federal-prosecutors-assailed-in-outcryover-sentencing.html (offering defendant either life without parole for “trafficking one kilogram of
heroin” or “sentence of 10 years” with guilty plea).
32
Bowers, supra note 9 at 1677.
33
William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The Limits
of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L. J. 1325, 1346
(1993) (citing the variability in jury decisions as one example).
34
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Oyler v. Boyles, 363 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) (noting that prosecutor
charging variability presents a problem where deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such
as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification).
35
ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION (4th ed. 2017), § 34.4(a)(ix).
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National District Attorneys Association (NDAA) standards highlight the importance of
“uniformity,” stating that “the goal of uniformity protects a victim or accused from
receiving substantially different treatment because the case was assigned to one individual
in the office and not to another.”36 In addition, when considering charges, the NDAA
standards list “charging decisions made for similarly-situated defendants” as one factor
that “may be considered.”37
Robust studies of prosecutor variability in charging do not exist, although one survey
of 43 Wisconsin district attorneys showed significant variability in charging decisions.38
Variability in charging decisions is difficult to study in part because “courts have limited
authority to review [charging and plea bargaining] decisions and identify and remedy
abuses.”39 Experts have recognized that “[i]n practice . . . the exercise of discretion varies
considerably among offices.”40
Office structure may play a role in charging variability, and overall the more
centralized charging practices, the less variability between prosecutors. For example, Ron
Wright and Marc Miller examined the actions taken in New Orleans to “ensure reasonable
uniformity in screening decisions.”41 In another study Ron Wright and Kay Levine
conducted interviews with 42 misdemeanor and drug prosecutors in the Southeast, finding
one recurring theme: “the need for consistency among different prosecutors who work in

36

NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 1-5.4 and
commentary (2009).
37
Id. at 4-1.3(i).
38
Kim Banks Mayer, Comment, Applying Open Records Policy to Wisconsin District
Attorneys: Can Charging Guidelines Promote Public Awareness? 1996 WIS. L. REV. 295, 299
(1996).
39
Bruce Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, 92 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 51 (2016) 58–59 (citing United States v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296, 1299–1300 (9th
Cir. 1991)).
40
Catherine M. Coles, Community Prosecution, Problem Solving, and Public Accountability:
The Evolving Strategy of the American Prosecutor, HARV. KENNEDY SCH. 11 (Oct. 2000),
https://www.innovations.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/community_prosecution.pdf.
41
Wright & Miller, supra note 12 at 62–66. Wright and Miller discuss a number of structural
changes aimed at achieving more uniformity including assigning the role of screening to senior trial
attorneys (id. at 62), tracking data on the reasons for each decision in the process to try ensure
consistency even with the high staff turnover (id. at 62, 66), assigning some types of cases “to
screeners with special expertise” (ex: grouping by drug cases, ordinary cases, homicides, rapes,
etc.), having the screener interview key witnesses and victims (and sometimes the officer as well).
Id. at 63. There were also some procedural changes made through office policies: to “charge the
most serious crime the facts will support at trial” (id.), requiring that “the charges chosen for the
information will stay in place through trial” to address overcharging, supervisory review of all
refusals to charge, policy discouraging refusal to charge specific types of crime (like domestic
violence cases), “[a] supervisor must approve any decision to drop or change charges after the
information is filed” and creating “a ‘stigma’ . . . in reducing charges.” Id. at 64. The office also
declines to prosecute a large number of cases to encourage “police officers to investigate more
thoroughly.” Id. at 65.
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the same office.”42 Wright and Levine theorized that there was a “correlation between
social architecture and consistency”: the more hierarchical the office, the greater emphasis
on consistency.43 Stephanos Bibas has also asserted that “hierarchy and centralization
improve consistent, accountable application of rules.”44 Specifically, creating “centralized
charging units” has been theorized to decrease variability by reducing the temptation to
“overcharge[] weak cases so that they can later charge-bargain them away.”45 Others have
theorized that variability may be a result of a lack of office-wide policies or reliance on
“unit-specific policy making.”46 When chief prosecutors “rel[y] on unit managers to
translate their philosophy into policies,” managers may vary in their approaches, “creating
opportunities for inconsistencies across units and over time.”47 Overall the lack of office
policies in charging or a centralized charging unit has been theorized to cause variability
in prosecutor charging.
Most of the controls on prosecutor charging are imposed informally due to social
norms, although prosecutors maintain considerable discretion. According to Marc Miller
and Ron Wright, outside of formal rules, social norms “can create rules within a
prosecutor’s office that constrain and regulate the discretion of individual prosecutors.”48
These norms are in no way articulated in any organized manner.49 Some experts have
recommended that prosecutors should have some informal controls that ensure consistency
in charging and plea bargaining within an office.50 Though without written standards, “it is
only natural that there will be a lack of uniformity in filing decisions and a breakdown in
42

Kay L. Levine & Ronald F. Wright, Prosecution in 3-D, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1119, 1171 (2013).
43
Id.
44
Stephanos Bibas, supra note 14, at 1005 (citing Dan Richman, Institutional Coordination
and Sentencing Reform, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2055, 2062–73 (2006)). In the plea-bargaining context,
offices with less hierarchical structures had greater variability between prosecutors’ decisions within
the office than in offices that placed greater emphasis on “professionalism” and enforcement of clear
policies. JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS
OF CRIMINAL COURTS 85–86, 116–17, 146–54 (1977) (comparing plea bargaining discretion and
organizational structures in Baltimore, Chicago, and Detroit).
45
Stephanos Bibas, supra note 14, at 1001 (2009); Wright & Miller, supra note 12 at 61–82
(finding that plea bargaining in New Orleans was reduced when centralized screening processes
were implemented).
46
Don Stemen & Bruce Frederick, Rules, Resources, and Relationships: Contextual
Constraints on Prosecutorial Decision Making, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 72 (2013).
47
Id. 71–72 (2013) (“Allowing unit-specific policies and norms to develop may result in
simple differences in attitudes about the appropriate sentence recommended in a plea offer or it may
result in major, fundamental differences in the overall approach to evaluating cases.”).
48
Miller & Wright, supra note 6 at 178; Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial
Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 837, 840 (2004) (“[P]rosecutors should make decisions based on
articulable principles or subprinciples that command broad societal acceptance”).
49
Green & Zacharias, supra note 48 (“[P]rosecutors have never, either individually or
collectively, undertaken the task of identifying workable norms for the array of discretionary
decisions that their offices make each day.”).
50
Pizzi, supra note 33 at 1345.
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the implementation of prosecutor’s decisions.”51 Josh Bowers has recognized that
discretion will always seep into prosecutor enforcement of the law, despite the desire to
reach consistency.52 But greater transparency may provide more motivation toward
consistency in decision-making and “can help stakeholders to monitor prosecutors’
performance and to push for more concrete policies.”53 While uniformity in charging is not
a requirement for prosecutors, some scholars have argued that greater transparency in
prosecutor decisions or centralized decisionmaking may help reduce variability or
improper prosecutor motives.
B. Severity in Charging Decisions
There is little in way of national or local guidance on the severity of charges
prosecutors bring for any particular set of alleged facts. ABA guidance on the severity of
charges is limited to encouraging prosecutors to “act with integrity and balanced judgment
to increase public safety both by pursuing appropriate criminal charges of appropriate
severity,” and by using their “discretion to not pursue criminal charges in appropriate
circumstances.”54 NDAA guidance is similarly abstract, encouraging prosecutors to file
charges that the prosecutor “believes adequately encompass the accused’s criminal
activity” and that they “reasonably believe[] can be substantiated by admissible evidence
at trial.”55 There is no national admonition to limit prosecutor charging when there is
discretion to do so. Indeed, there are some obvious examples of explicit guidance or
informal rules advocating for charging the most serious crimes available. For example, the
U.S. Attorney Manual states that “a Federal prosecutor should initially charge the most
serious, readily provable offense or offenses consistent with the defendant’s conduct.”56
Some members of the Supreme Court in recent years indicated that a Justice Department
policy of charging the most severe offense as a general rule raises serious concerns.57 But
this federal policy has not been overturned.

51
Norman Maleng, Charging and Sentencing: Where Prosecutors’ Guidelines Help Both
Sides, 1 CRIM. JUST. 6, 41 (1987).
52
Bowers, supra note 9 at 1676.
53
Stephanos Bibas, supra note 14, at 1007.
54
ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 35, at § 3-1.2(b).
55
NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N, supra note 36 at 4-2.2.
56
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUST. MANUAL § 9-27,300 (2020); see also Memorandum from Jeff
Sessions, Office of the Att’y Gen., Department Charging and Sentencing Policy (May 10, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/965896/download (“[I]t is a core principle that
prosecutors should charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable offense.”); but see John
Ashcroft, Memo Regarding Policy on Charging of Criminal Defendants, DEP’T OF JUST. (Sept. 22,
2003), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm (“[C]harges should
not be filed simply to exert leverage to induce a plea.”).
57
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 28–30, Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (2015) (No.
13-7451) (Justice Scalia stated, in response to such a rule, “I’m going to be very careful about how
severe I make statutes . . . or how much coverage I give to severe statutes.”; Chief Justice Roberts
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Research has suggested that junior prosecutors are more likely to bring the most
severe charges, for a variety of reasons. One public defender argues that the decision by
new prosecutors to pursue the maximum charges “comes from a fear of mistakes, of
making the wrong judgment call about a stranger, of granting leniency when the recipient
may disappoint by committing another crime[,] . . . of being made a fool by some sly
defendant, or duped by some defense attorney, or being called soft on crime.”58 Wright and
Levine have found in their studies of prosecutors that young prosecutors may consider
themselves “superheroes, ready to try any case on the docket” while more seasoned
prosecutors think of themselves as “arbitrators, negotiators, ‘BS meters,’ and advocates.”59
Their research has found that prosecutors with less experience were more likely “to ignore
the human dimension of many cases, approaching each file with a standardized view,
focusing on the need to punish everyone.”60 As such, inexperience made prosecutors less
likely to dismiss charges and more likely to closely follow the most obvious charges
available in statutes.61 In addition, in interviews, “[e]ntry-level and junior prosecutors were
more likely than their experienced colleagues to say that it is important to stick with the
most serious charges during plea negotiations.”62
The plea-bargaining process may also play a role in the severity of initial charging
decisions. Some evidence exists that prosecutors charge aggressively to allow for a lesser
plea.63 For instance, in Alafair Burke’s study, one prosecutor stated that he would “charge
aggressively to allow for a plea to a lesser offense.”64 The charging decision is closely tied
to plea bargaining, which may begin even before formal charges are filed.65 Notably,
NDAA’s National Prosecution Standards do not include any restriction on filing charges
to obtain plea bargaining leverage.”66

also stated that such a policy could give “extraordinary leverage . . . [to] Federal prosecutors” if the
statute were to cover the alleged criminal behavior in that particular case).
58
Fan Li, Youthful Indiscretion: The Structural Challenge of Inexperienced Prosecutors, in
CAN THEY DO THAT? UNDERSTANDING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 115 (Melba V. Pearson ed.,
2020).
59
Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, The Cure for Young Prosecutors’ Syndrome, 56 ARIZ.
L. REV. 1065, 1126 (2014).
60
Id. at 1084.
61
Id. at 1084–85.
62
Id. at 1087–88.
63
See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, Cognitive Bias, and Plea Bargaining, 91
MARQ. L. REV. 183, 201–02 (2007) (describing how prosecutors can “anchor” on preliminary
decisions and then “inadequately adjust” from that initial anchor); Alschuler, supra note 16, at 140
(arguing that more severe charging decisions incentivized by plea bargaining); Robert E. Scott &
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1965 (1992) (arguing that
broad criminal statutes give prosecutors “an unchecked opportunity to overcharge and generate easy
pleas.”).
64
Burke, supra note 66, at 202.
65
Pizzi, supra note 33, at 1355.
66
Jeffrey Bellin, Theories of Prosecution, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1203, 1225 (2020) (citing NAT’L
DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 4-2.3 (2009)).
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The line between overcharging and proper severity is unclear. Charging the highest
provable offense may be seen as overcharging by some while considered fair by others.
Jeffrey Bellin is in the latter camp as he recently argued that overcharging should be
defined as charging a defendant with an offense that is not “readily provable” or an offense
for which the jury should not convict.”67 But on the other side, Green argues “that people
who commit crimes should not necessarily be punished as harshly as the law permits.”68
The recent scholarly focus on progressive prosecution has discouraged severe charging,69
often focusing on declination as one way to limit severity.70
Like with variability, there is no explicit guidance for prosecutors not to seek the most
serious charge they can prove. Scholars and federal prosecutor guidebooks have supported
this position, though the tide is turning towards advising prosecutors to decline to charge
when possible to reduce the carceral state. Our study presents respondents with a
hypothetical, relatively minor crime to explore both the variability and severity of
punishment prosecutors recommend for the same crime.
C. National and Local Guidance for Prosecutors
Notwithstanding their broad discretion, prosecutors are subject to rules of professional
conduct in their jurisdiction, ABA and NDAA guidance, and possibly internal office
guidelines on prosecutor charging. While these standards may technically apply, there is
little accountability if prosecutors refuse to comply71 and little assurance that prosecutors
are even aware of these guidelines.
1. Rules of Professional Conduct

67

Id.
Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Discretion: The Difficulty and Necessity of Public Inquiry,
123 DICK. L. REV. 589, 599, 612 (2019) (noting that inequitable results may occur when “one victim
may wish to pursue charges and a harsh sentence and yet the other victim [in a similar case] may
not want charges filed.”).
69
Bellin, supra note 69, at 1248 (identifying “the progressive intuition that prosecutors should
not charge a more severe offense to obtain plea bargaining leverage.”); see also Maura Ewing,
America’s Leading Reform-Minded District Attorney Has Taken His Most Radical Step Yet, SLATE
(Dec. 4, 2018), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/12/philadelphia-district-attorney-larrykrasner-criminal-justice-reform.html (quoting Larry Krasner, “The era of trying to get away with
the highest charge regardless of the facts is over.”).
70
See, e.g., W. Kerrel Murray, Populist Prosecutorial Nullification, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. __
(forthcoming 2021) (discussing prosecutorial nullification as a populist response to severe criminal
codes); Benjamin Levin, Imagining the Progressive Prosecutor, MINN. L. J. __ (forthcoming 2021)
(manuscript at 135) (arguing that “the anti-carceral prosecutor seeks to enact policies of
declination.”).
71
Corn & Gershowitz, supra note 13, at 396.
68
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Prosecutors are governed by standards of professional conduct in their jurisdiction,
and through the American Bar Association.72 However, as Bruce Green points out, the idea
that prosecutors have “higher ethical obligations than other lawyers . . . is largely absent
from the ethics rules.”73 While the comments to ABA Rule 3.8 state that prosecutors have
“the responsibility of a minister of justice,”74 this charge is ill-defined.75 Some jurisdictions
“have revised or supplemented [ABA] Rule 3.8(a) to further regulate prosecutors’ charging
decisions.”76 But even if these guidelines have been supplemented, “[b]y and large . . . bar
authorities have proven to be ineffectual” when it comes to accountability.77 Indeed, when
prosecutors act inappropriately in violation of the rules of professional conduct, discipline
is rare.78 The conventional wisdom in this area is that “disciplinary authorities do not
effectively regulate prosecutors.”79 Sanctions—if they exist—are typically minimal,80 and

72

ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 35, at § 3-1.2(c). The NDAA has
challenged the legitimacy of ABA guidance. Brief for National District Attorneys Association as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3, 5, Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73 (2012) (referring to the ABA
as “a private organization that does not speak for prosecutors” and stating “that the ABA has become
captive to the narrow adversarial interests of the criminal defense bar.”).
73
Bruce A. Green & Samuel J. Levine, Disciplinary Regulation of Prosecutors as a Remedy
for Abuses of Prosecutorial Discretion: A Descriptive and Normative Analysis, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 143, 149 (2016); see also R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can
Teach Us About A Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to “Seek Justice”, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635, 691
(2006) (arguing that Model Rule 3.8’s emphasis on the “responsibility” of prosecutors to seek justice
“is obscured” both by “minimum conduct rules within Rule 3.8” and “burying the ‘justice’
exhortation in a later comment to the Rule”).
74
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. [1] (AM. BAR ASS’N, 2018).
75
Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors
Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 48 (1991) (arguing that the vagueness of the charge to “do
justice” “has significant costs” and “undermines professional discipline of prosecutorial
misconduct.”); Kenneth Bresler, Pretty Phrases: The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice and
Administrator of Justice, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1301, 1301 (1996) (“When the ABA advises
prosecutors to act as ‘ministers of justice’ or ‘administrators of justice,’ it is using juris-babble that
is practically meaningless to prosecutors and to the ABA itself.”).
76
Green & Levine, supra note 73, at 152.
77
Bibas, supra note 14, at 976.
78
Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors and Professional Regulation, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 873,
874 (2012); see also KATHLEEN M. RIDOL & MAURICE POSSLEY, N. CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT,
PREVENTABLE ERROR: A REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA 1997–2009
(2010), http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/ncippubs/2 (finding a significant lack of State Bar
discipline for prosecutorial misconduct in California); see also Mark C. Niles, A New Balance of
Evils: Prosecutorial Misconduct, Iqbal, and the End of Absolute Immunity, 13 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. &
CIV. LIBERTIES 137, 148–54 (2017) (“Criminal culpability and/or professional sanction . . . have
little if any impact on the actual practice of law in this country.”).
79
Green & Levine, supra note 73, at 144 (noting that “proportionately fewer prosecutors are
publicly disciplined when compared with private practitioners”).
80
Bibas, supra note 14, at 977.
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overall prosecutors are disciplined rarely even relative to other lawyers.81 It is certainly
possible that broader ethics rules could be applied to prosecutors in some instances, but
these rules may not extend to “reach abuses of prosecutorial charging discretion[.]”82 As a
whole, while rules of professional conduct exist for prosecutors, they do not regulate
prosecutor charging discretion.
2. ABA and NDAA Guidance
National guidelines—from the ABA and NDAA—do not seek to limit prosecutor
charging beyond what the evidence supports for a conviction. The ABA offers some
guidance in the form of Criminal Justice Standards, but there is little specificity or
limitations for prosecutors in these recommendations. For example, the ABA cautions that
“[a] prosecutor should seek or file criminal charges only if the prosecutor reasonably
believes that the charges are supported by probable cause, that admissible evidence will be
sufficient to support conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the decision to charge
is in the interests of justice.”83 Critics have claimed that this probable cause requirement is
“essentially meaningless” and the “sufficient admissible evidence to support a conviction
[standard] is likewise far too easily satisfied to provide any real limitation upon, or
incentive to exercise, case-specific evaluation by the prosecutor.”84 The ABA standards
make clear they are purely “aspirational” and “are not intended to serve as the basis for . .
. professional discipline[.]”85 Similarly, the NDAA standards are “aspirational” and “are
not intended to . . . be used by the judiciary in determining whether a prosecutor committed
error or engaged in improper conduct; [or] be used by disciplinary agencies when passing
upon allegations of violations of rules of ethical conduct[.]”86 The NDAA has expressed
disagreement with the Rules of Professional Conduct on at least one occasion.87 The
NDAA’s position seems to be that “prosecutors . . . should be exempt from state-court rules
81

Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 755

(2001).
82

Green & Levine, supra note 73, at 153.
ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 35, at § 3-4.3(a).
84
Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 BYU L. REV.
669, 680–81 (1992); see also Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
259, 268 (2001) (“If probable cause is the only restriction on prosecutorial charging discretion, then
it is a very broad power indeed.”). The ABA also encourages prosecutors to “make use of ethical
guidance offered by existing organizations, and . . . to establish and make use of an ethics advisory
group[.]”ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 35, at § 3-1.2(d).
85
ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 35, at § 3-1.1(b) (“These Standards . . . are
aspirational or describe ‘best practices,’ and are not intended to serve as the basis for the imposition
of professional discipline, to create substantive or procedural rights for accused or convicted
persons, to create a standard of care for civil liability, or to serve as a predicate for a motion to
suppress evidence or dismiss a charge.”).
86
NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N, supra note 36, at Introduction.
87
Brief for National District Attorneys Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
13, Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73 (2012) (taking issue with the obligation that Model Rule 3.8(d) places
on prosecutors in the states in which it has been adopted).
83
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of professional conduct that do more than mirror preexisting legal obligations.”88 Neither
national body seeks to limit prosecutor discretion in charging.
3. Internal Standards of Individual Prosecutor Offices
With a gap in national regulation,89 there is an argument that internal standards and
regulations could serve an important role in limiting prosecutorial discretion.90 In most
jurisdictions, chief prosecutors are elected and are therefore thought to be accountable to
the public. “[H]ead prosecutors can align their subordinates’ actions with principals’
interests by writing down and enforcing procedural and substantive office policies.”91 Both
the ABA and NDAA stress the importance of policies in individual prosecutor’s offices.
According to the ABA, “[e]ach prosecutor’s office should seek to develop general policies
to guide the exercise of prosecutorial discretion[.]”92 The NDAA standards clarify that
“[i]nitial standards or guidelines for charging will be established by the chief prosecutor
only[.]”93
Despite guidance to formulate internal policies for prosecutors, there is little incentive
to promulgate or follow such internal rules.94 One study indicated that prosecutors’ offices
lacked effective policies or structures for proper accountability.95 Prosecutor offices may
also lack clear standards guiding charging decisions.96 Prosecutorial guidelines governing
charging and bargaining discretion “should be specific enough to provide genuine guidance
when applied to a particular set of facts.”97 On a federal level, the United States Attorneys’
Manual “does contain some general standards for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion,
but they are written so broadly that they provide little guidance.”98 Prosecutors may not

88

Green, supra note 78, at 886.
Bibas, supra note 14, at 1016 (“Conventional external regulation has failed to guide
prosecutors.”).
90
Miller & Wright, supra note 6 (arguing that internal policies and regulations can be
effective).
91
Bibas, supra note 14, at 1003.
92
ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 35, at § 3-2.4(a).
93
NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N,, supra note 36, at 4-2.4 Commentary.
94
Vorenberg, supra note 9, at 1564–65 (“Few prosecutors’ offices, if left to their own devices,
will promulgate guidelines that limit their freedom in a significant way, and courts are unlikely to
require standards in the absence of legislative direction.”).
95
Joel B. Rudin, The Supreme Court Assumes Errant Prosecutors Will Be Disciplined by Their
Offices or the Bar: Three Case Studies that Prove that Assumption Wrong, 80 FORDHAM L. REV.
537, 539 (2011) (presenting case studies from “three New York City District Attorneys’ Offices”;
finding that the offices failed to discipline prosecutors and lacked codes of conduct).
96
See Levine & Wright, supra note 42, at 1174 (finding that none of the offices studied in two
Southeast metropolitan areas used “a charging or sentencing grid”).
97
Vorenberg, supra note 9, at 1561–62.
98
Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper Limits
for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 999 (1995); see also Amsler, supra note
13, at 186 (noting that, aside from prosecution “on the basis of race, religion, or any other ‘arbitrary
89
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want internal rules to be too specific. Courts have “consistently . . . ruled that a prosecutor’s
failure to follow applicable written criteria cannot serve as a defense or cause of action.”99
But fear of litigation or public review might prevent more specific written charging
guidelines.100 One motivation that might lead prosecutors to “be reluctant to adopt
[charging] polic[ies] is the fact that prosecutors have to run for election and any policy that
might be seen as ‘soft’ on crime can raise a political issue that might put the prosecutor on
the defensive.”101 Thus, formal and public guidelines “may result in guidelines that are
considerably harsher than those policies that an office would be willing to live with on an
informal basis.”102 Fear of public oversight and litigation may encourage prosecutors not
to promulgate specific charging guidelines.
Even when guidelines or charging grids exist, they may not be used. One study of 42
misdemeanor and drug prosecutors in the Southeast found that none of the sites studied
“employe[d] a charging or sentencing grid that prosecutors are supposed to follow[.]”103 In
addition, a survey of prosecutors in 2018 found that although many prosecutors (65% of
those surveyed) used data to set guidelines, they often did not use the data to track
compliance with office guidance.104 Some scholars have noted that even when charging
policies exist, they tend to have little impact on individual case evaluations by line
prosecutors.105
Charging guidelines, while an important step, may be limited in their efficacy.106 Our
study questions prosecutors about whether they have internal standards or guidelines that
guide their decision making and limit their charging ability.
D. Factors Relevant to Prosecutors in Charging Decisions
There are no universal factors prosecutors must consider in charging decisions, except
avoiding suspect classifications such as defendant’s race or national origin.107 The ABA
classification’ or protected right,” charging decisions are “largely subject to nonmandatory
guidelines.”).
99
Peter Krug, Prosecutorial Discretion and Its Limits, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 643, 654 (2002);
Pizzi, supra note 33, at 1366–67.
100
Even when prosecutors offices have internal guidelines, they may oppose public
transparency or review of such guidelines. Pizzi, supra note 33, at 1364.
101
Id. at 1365.
102
Id.
103
Levine & Wright, supra note 42, at 1174.
104
ROBIN OLSEN ET AL., URBAN INST. FOR JUSTICE, COLLECTING AND USING DATA FOR
PROSECUTORIAL
DECISIONMAKING
11–12
(Sept.
2018),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/99044/collecting_and_using_data_for_prosec
utorial_decisionmaking_0.pdf.
105
Melilli, supra note 84, at 683.
106
Pizzi, supra note 33, at 1346 n.95 (“guidelines are oversold as a remedy for limiting
prosecutorial discretion”).
107
Green, supra note 71, at 614 (“[O]nce one gets beyond the obvious suspect classifications,
there is no agreement on which considerations are or are not legitimate”).
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standards include a laundry list of potential factors prosecutors “may” consider when
deciding whether to bring charges.108 For instance, the ABA standards encourage
consideration of “the strength of the case,” “the extent . . . of harm caused,” and “the views
and motives of the victim or complainant.”109 The NDAA standards include a similar
lengthy list of factors that “may” be considered when screening potential charges.110 These
NDAA standards allow consideration of “insufficiency of admissible evidence,”
“availability of suitable diversion or rehabilitation programs,” and “[w]hether the size of
the loss or the extent of the harm caused . . . is too small to warrant a criminal sanction.”111
In addition, the NDAA standards list factors “that may be relevant” to whether the specific
charges “are consistent with the interests of justice.”112 A Washington State Supreme Court
108

ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 35, at § 3-4.4(a) (“Among the factors
which the prosecutor may properly consider in exercising discretion to initiate, decline, or dismiss
a criminal charge . . . are: (i) the strength of the case; (ii) the prosecutor’s doubt that the accused is
in fact guilty; (iii) the extent or absence of harm caused by the offense; (iv) the impact of prosecution
or non-prosecution on the public welfare; (v) the background and characteristics of the offender,
including any voluntary restitution or efforts at rehabilitation; (vi) whether the authorized or likely
punishment or collateral consequences are disproportionate in relation to the particular offense or
the offender; (vii) the views and motives of the victim or complainant; (viii) any improper conduct
by law enforcement; (ix) unwarranted disparate treatment of similarly situated persons; (x) potential
collateral impact on third parties, including witnesses or victims; (xi) cooperation of the offender in
the apprehension or conviction of others; (xii) the possible influence of any cultural, ethnic,
socioeconomic or other improper biases; (xiii) changes in law or policy; (xiv) the fair and efficient
distribution of limited prosecutorial resources; (xv) the likelihood of prosecution by another
jurisdiction; and (xvi) whether the public’s interests in the matter might be appropriately vindicated
by available civil, regulatory, administrative, or private remedies.”).
109
Id. at § 3-4.4(a).
110
NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N, supra note 36, at 4-1.3 (2009) (“Factors that may be considered
in [the charging] decision include: a. Doubt about the accused’s guilt; b. Insufficiency of admissible
evidence to support a conviction; c. The negative impact of a prosecution on a victim; d. The
availability of adequate civil remedies; e. The availability of suitable diversion and rehabilitative
programs; f. Provisions for restitution; g. Likelihood of prosecution by another criminal justice
authority; h. Whether non-prosecution would assist in achieving other legitimate goals, such as the
investigation or prosecution of more serious offenses; i. The charging decisions made for similarlysituated defendants; j. The attitude and mental status of the accused; l. A history of non-enforcement
of the applicable law; m. Failure of law enforcement to perform necessary duties or investigations;
n. The expressed desire of an accused to release potential civil claims against victims, witnesses,
law enforcement agencies and their personnel, or the prosecutor and his personnel, where such
desire is expressed after having the opportunity to obtain advice of counsel and is knowing and
voluntary; o. Whether the alleged crime represents a substantial departure from the accused’s history
of living a law-abiding life; p Whether the accused has already suffered substantial loss in
connection with the alleged crime; q. Whether the size of the loss or the extent of the harm caused
by the alleged crime is too small to warrant a criminal sanction[.]”).
111
Id. at 4-1.3.
112
Id. at 4-2.4 (relevant factors may include: “a. The nature of the offense, including whether
the crime involves violence or bodily injury; b. The probability of conviction; c. The characteristics
of the accused that are relevant to his or her blameworthiness or responsibility, including the
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case specifically identified “the public interest as well as the strength of the case which
could be proven” as relevant to a prosecutor’s decision “whether to charge suspects with
criminal offenses.”113 Determining what factors prosecutors consider and how they are
balanced is difficult, as prosecutors have resisted pleas to publish charging guidelines.114
Prior research indicates that some common factors and considerations are important
for prosecutor charging decisions. Theses include “the seriousness of the offense, the
defendant’s prior criminal record, the victim’s interest in prosecution, the strength of the
evidence, the likelihood of conviction, and the availability of alternative dispositions.”115
Other factors traditionally considered by prosecutors in deciding whether to press charges
include “the citizen’s education, vocational skills, employment record, family ties and
responsibilities, community ties, and the socioeconomic status of the offender.”116 Some
of these factors are arguably not permissible, including education or socioeconomic status
since they criminalize poverty and are associated with race.117 Other unstated factors for
prosecutor charging include “internal rules, external resource constraints, and a balancing
of interdependent relationships.”118 Office funding levels are also a factor in charging
decisions, as limited resources require prioritization.119 And a progressive prosecutor may
consider “whether [a defendant] ‘deserve[s],’ or the community benefits from” bringing
charges.120 Our study will explore factors prosecutors claim are important to their charging
decisions.
E. Declination

accused’s criminal history; d. Potential deterrent value of incapacitating the accused in the event of
a conviction; f. The willingness of the offender to cooperate with law enforcement; g. The
defendant’s relative level of culpability in the criminal activity; h. The status of the victim, including
the victim’s age or special vulnerability; j. Excessive costs of prosecution in relation to the
seriousness of the offense; k. Recommendation of the involved law enforcement personnel; l. The
impact of the crime on the community; m. Any other aggravating or mitigating circumstances.”).
113
State v. Judge, 675 P.2d 219, 223 (Wash. 1984).
114
Misner, supra note 9 at 744 (“Attempts to convince prosecutors to publish the guidelines
for making prosecutorial charging decisions . . . have generally gone unheeded.”).
115
Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 34–35 (1998).
116
Pizzi, supra note 33, at 1368–69.
117
Christopher Robertson, Shima Baradaran Baughman & Megan S. Wright, Race and Class:
A Randomized Experiment with Prosecutors, 16 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 807 (2019) (arguing
that consideration of socioeconomic status and education may be one cause of racial disparities in
the criminal justice system)..
118
Stemen & Frederick, supra note 46 at 83.
119
Vorenberg, supra note 9 at 1542–43 (“Funding levels determine how many cases can be
brought and inevitably force prosecutors’ offices to give little or no attention to many chargeable
crimes.”).
120
Jeffrey Bellin, Defending Progressive Prosecution, 39 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. _
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 26).
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Whether to bring charges, or decline, is entirely up to the prosecutor’s discretion.121
Indeed, the prosecutor’s decision not to charge a case is largely unreviewable.122 The ABA
standards clarify that there are some situations where charges may not be appropriate but
fail to clarify when such a situation exists, only stating that “[t]he prosecutor should . . .
consider, and where appropriate develop or assist in developing alternatives to
prosecution[.]”123 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct clarify that a prosecutor
should not bring a charge if the “prosecutor knows [the charge] is not supported by
probable cause.”124 The NDAA standards do not include significant guidance covering
when declination is appropriate. However, they do specify that prosecutor’s offices should
maintain “a record of the reasons for declining a prosecution” where such record is
“permitted by law.”125
Common reasons for declination of charges include practical considerations or
broader considerations of fairness. According to Angela Davis, “[t]he decision to forego
charges may be based on practical considerations such as the triviality of the offense and/or
the victim’s lack of interest in prosecution.126 This decision may also be based on
considerations of fairness and justice in a particular case.”127 Richard Frase indicates that
the declination decision is closely related to the offense in the case.128 A study of federal
declination decisions in the Northern District of Illinois found that “the most common
specific reason for declination was the state-prosecution alternative. In order, the next most
frequently cited reasons were: small amount of loss by the victims; prior record of the
defendant; small amount of contraband, such as drugs or guns; the isolated nature of the
defendant’s act; and insufficient evidence of a criminal act.”129 However, there was a wide
variety in reasons cited for declination.130 Categorizing these reasons into ten groups,
“[m]inor offense appears most frequently, followed by state prosecution, insufficient
evidence, and defendant characteristics.”131 A similar study of causes for prosecutor
121

Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (“[S]o long as the prosecutor has
probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision
whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests
entirely in his discretion.”).
122
Misner, supra note 9 at 743.
123
ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 36 at § 3-1.2(e) (“The prosecutor should
be knowledgeable about, consider, and where appropriate develop or assist in developing
alternatives to prosecution or conviction[.]”).
124
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT, supra note 74 at r. 3.8(a).
125
NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N, supra note 36 at 4-1.7 (2009).
126
Davis, supra note 24, at 409
127
Id.
128
Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges: A Quantitative Study of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 246, 257 (1980) (finding that “importation of
marijuana[,] . . . theft of government property, theft from interstate shipment, miscellaneous frauds,
civil rights cases, and simple assaults” were “almost never prosecuted.”).
129
Id. at 262.
130
Id. (“[A] total of forty-three different reasons were cited in sample declinations.”).
131
Id. at 262–65.
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declination has not been conducted using a national sample of prosecutors. Our study will
explore reasons why state prosecutors decline to bring cases.
II. NATIONAL PROSECUTOR STUDY DATA AND METHODS
The data for this study of prosecutors comes from an experimental survey instrument
administered to state and local prosecutors in 2017. The survey contained questions about
how the respondents made charging decisions and demographic questions. The survey also
contained a vignette, which consisted of fictional police reports describing a minor crime,
and questions about what charging decision respondents would make based on the facts
presented and stipulated laws of the jurisdiction. The vignette manipulated the race and
social class of the defendant so that we could assess the impact of these status
characteristics on prosecutors’ charging decisions. The findings from the experiment
portion of the study, showing no evidence of race or class bias on prosecutors’ charging
decisions, have been previously published.132
This article presents additional findings from responses to the vignette questions as
well as quantitative findings from the survey questions about how prosecutors make
decisions in other cases. Additionally, this study presents findings from qualitative analysis
of prosecutors’ responses to open-ended survey questions about decision making.
A. Sample
We were interested in how state and local (not federal) prosecutors make charging
decisions, but unfortunately there is no list of all such prosecutors. We had hoped to be
able to partner with professional associations to which prosecutors belong to obtain the
names and contact information of affiliated prosecutors, but those groups declined to
cooperate. We thus created our own sample of state and local prosecutors.
To ensure our sample contained prosecutors from across the country, we selected one
to two states from each of the nine U.S. Census Bureau regions and conducted web searches
for state and local prosecutors’ names and email addresses. Some state websites list all
state employees, including prosecutors. More often, however, if a government website
listed the names and contact information for prosecutors, this information was available on
county websites. Many counties opt only to list the name of the head prosecutor, however,
so we also used state bar association websites to collect names and contact information for
members who indicated they were or had been state or local prosecutors. Finally, we
submitted Freedom of Information Act requests to states for lists of their prosecutors and
email addresses. Our final sample included 4,484 state and local prosecutors.133
We then emailed those prosecutors inviting them to participate in the study,134 which
we hosted on Qualtrics. Upon completion of the study, respondents could request a gift
132

Robertson et al., supra note 117.
This is not a representative sample. And there is bias in who opted or declined to participate
in this study. Some head prosecutors opted out on behalf of their entire office.
134
This study was approved by the University of Utah Institutional Review Board.
133
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card to Amazon in the amount of five dollars. Ultimately, 542 prosecutors completed the
survey for a response rate of 12.09 percent.
A detailed description of the sample can be seen in Table 1.135 Most respondents were
men (65.85%), white (90.26%), and not Hispanic (96.07%). The average age of
respondents was 46 years, and respondents averaged about twelve and a half years as a
prosecutor. 22.55% of respondents were the head prosecutor in their office. The average
office size was about 35 prosecutors. Most respondents were from the Mountain (24.07%),
Midwest (21.3%), and South Atlantic (14.63%) regions.136 Many respondents were
prosecutors in jurisdictions containing less than 100,000 people (42.49%) or between
100,000 and 500,000 people (28.58%).
Table 1—Descriptive Statistics
Percent of Sample or Mean
Recommended Disposition of Case
Felony Charge
Monetary Penalty
Average Amount of Monetary Penalty
Confinement
Average Minimum Days of Confinement
Jurisdiction Characteristics
Average Size of Office
Size of Jurisdiction
Over 2,000,000 people
1,000,000-2,000,000 people
500,000-1,000,000 people
100,000-500,000 people
Less than 100,000 people
Region

16.05%
41.68%
$247.21
27.83%
25.73 days
34.83 prosecutors
7.42%
10.76%
10.76%
28.58%
42.49%

135

A similar table appeared in Robertson et al., supra note 117. The sample description
reported here differs slightly because in our prior work we eliminated some responses based on the
time a respondent spent on the study as a quality control mechanism to ensure the integrity of the
experimental portion of the study. For a description, see Robertson et al., supra note 117, at 819.
136
The regional breakdown is as follows.
New England: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, or
Vermont
Middle Atlantic: New Jersey, New York, or Pennsylvania
Midwest: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, or Wisconsin
West North Central: Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, or South
Dakota
South Atlantic: Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Virginia, or West Virginia
East South Central: Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, or Tennessee
West South Central: Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, or Oklahoma
Mountain: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, or Wyoming
Pacific: Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, or Washington
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New England
Middle Atlantic
Midwest
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific
Prosecutor Characteristics
Average Number of Years as Prosecutor
Head Prosecutor
Average Age
Gender
Male
Female
Race
White
Black/African American
American Indian/Alaska Native
Asian
Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander
Other
Hispanic
No
Mexican/Mexican American/Chicano
Puerto Rican
Cuban
Other Spanish/Hispanic/Latino

4.44%
3.52%
21.30%
10.93%
14.63%
8.52%
0.93%
24.07%
11.67%
12.52 years
22.55%
46.02 years
65.86%
34.14%
90.26%
3.93%
0.56%
1.12%
0.19%
3.93%
96.07%
1.50%
0.19%
0.94%
1.31%

B. Instrument
Our survey contained 23 questions with some follow up probes. The survey asked
prosecutors some screening questions to ensure that they were or had been prosecutors.
They then were asked to read two fictional police reports about a relatively minor crime
for which prosecutors could have recommended various charges or no charges at all. In the
vignette, a man at a train station was arrested for, in the words of one arresting officer,
“yelling obscenities, stopping patrons for money, and brandishing a knife.” The man was
emotionally distressed from a recent break up with his girlfriend and needed money for a
train ride, but when no one gave him any money, he became more upset. One witness
reported that the man, while holding a knife, had grabbed a woman’s arm after she refused
to give him money, but did not hurt or threaten her. Although people at the train station
were scared, no one was physically hurt. The man submitted to an arrest without incident.
We then provided sample criminal statutes and sentencing guidelines and asked
prosecutors what charges they would bring, if any. We also asked respondents what
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monetary penalty or term of confinement they would recommend, if any, and the reasoning
for their recommendation. These were open-ended questions, and a text box was provided
for respondents to write their penalty recommendations and reasoning.
We then asked a series of five close-ended questions about how respondents make
charging and plea-bargaining decisions in their office and provided space for respondents
to provide additional explanations if they desired. The survey concluded with eleven
questions about respondents’ office, jurisdiction, and demographic characteristics. We
designed the study to take approximately 15 minutes to complete and piloted it with
prosecutors in Salt Lake City.137
C. Method
As noted above, we have previously reported some findings from the experimental
portion of the study. In this paper, we report additional quantitative and qualitative analysis
of respondents’ punishment recommendations for the defendant described in the vignette
as well as descriptions of respondents’ prosecutorial decision-making process. We present
descriptive results from frequency distributions using the data from the close-ended survey
questions. The study also yielded qualitative data from the text that respondents provided
to the survey questions, which we transformed into quantitative data for purposes of
reporting descriptive statistics. We also coded qualitative data from the survey questions
and the experimental portion of the study inductively based on themes that emerged from
the data.
III. RESULTS OF NATIONAL PROSECUTOR STUDY
This part explains the results of our national prosecutor study. Part III.A. reviews the
recommended charges and penalties imposed by respondents for the hypothetical crime
they reviewed. Part III.B. reviews the various reasons respondents provide to support their
decisions. Some of these reasons include that respondents believe punishment is necessary
despite the fact that this is a minor crime. Others note financial or mental health condition
of the defendant, and others specifically note that a little jail time could teach the defendant
a lesson. After the respondents answered questions about the vignette, we then asked
respondents about how prosecutors in their office make charging decisions. We asked who
makes the charging decision, whether the crime is a felony or misdemeanor changes the
decision-making process, who prosecutes the case after decisions are made about charging,
and whether their office has internal guidelines or standards governing charging decisions.
The prosecutor responses about the general process for making charging decisions is
recounted in Part III.C.
A. Recommended Charges and Penalties
Respondents could choose from a range of charges to bring in response to the arrest
described in the vignette or to bring no charges at all. The below figure shows that just 18
137

See Appendix for the instrument.
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respondents declined to bring no charges, and that almost 80% of respondents brought
multiple charges. The mean number of charges recommended was 3.15 [CI 2.99, 3.31],
and the maximum number of charges recommended was 11 (the maximum number of
charges that could be recommended was 16).

Figure 1. Number of Charges
Seven or More
Six
Five
Four
Three
Two
One
Zero
0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

Number of Prosecutors

There was variation in the number of charges recommended by region in which the
respondent worked as a prosecutor. See Table 2 for the mean number of charges
recommended by region, as well as the range of charges recommended by region.
Table 2—Number of Charges by Region
Region
New England
Middle Atlantic
Midwest
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific

Mean
Charges
2.88
4.37
2.45
3.39
3.82
2.83
3.2
3.25
3.11

Number Minimum Number Maximum Number
Charges
Charges
0
8
1
10
0
10
0
8
0
11
0
6
2
6
0
10
1
8

There was one felony charge that respondents could select, and 16% opted to charge
the defendant with a felony (see Table 1).138 There was variation in whether a felony was
138

Similar results for outcome variables of interest appeared in Robertson et al., supra note
117. The results reported here differ slightly because in our prior work we eliminated some
responses based on the time a respondent spent on the study as a quality control mechanism to ensure
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charged by region in which the respondent worked as a prosecutor. See below Figure for
the percentage of respondents who recommended a felony charge by region. Notably, the
South Atlantic region prosecutors were most likely to recommend a felony charge,
followed by the Mountain region prosecutors.

Figure 2. Felony Charge by Region
Percent Recommending
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While the vast majority of respondents would bring multiple charges, far fewer
recommended a monetary penalty. Almost 60% of respondents recommended no monetary
penalty in this instance, although there was significant variation by region. All West South
Central prosecutors recommended a monetary penalty.

the integrity of the experimental portion of the study. For a description, see Robertson et al., supra
note 117, at 819.
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Figure 3. Monetary Penalty by Region
Percent Recommending
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Of those who did recommend a monetary penalty, the recommended amount tended
to be less than $500 (mean recommended monetary penalty was $247.21 [CI $200.05,
$294.37] (see Table 1). It is important to note, however, that some respondents did
recommend amounts up to $5,000. See below figure for distribution of recommended
monetary penalty.

Figure 4. Minimum Monetary Penalty
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The amount of monetary penalty recommended also varied by region, shown in the
below table. The minimum monetary penalty in all regions was zero, except in West South
Central where the minimum monetary penalty was $500.
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Table 3—Amount of Monetary Penalty by Region
Region

Mean Monetary Penalty Maximum
Penalty
$10.87
$250
$88.89
$750
$191.83
$5,000
$138.46
$1,000
$355.84
$2,500
$202.22
$1,000
$500
$500
$359.17
$5,000
$215.74
$2,500

New England
Middle Atlantic
Midwest
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific

Monetary

Respondents were even less likely to recommend confinement. Over 70% of
respondents recommended no term of confinement, although this varied by region. See
Figure 5.

Figure 5. Confinement by Region
Percent Recommending
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Of those who did recommend confinement, the recommendation tended to be less than
30 days in jail (mean recommended days of confinement was 25.73 days [CI 17.37, 34.10]
(see Table 1).139 See below figure for the distribution of recommendations for minimum
days of confinement.

139

Some respondents recommended a year in jail (11), and two respondents recommended
longer than two years in jail.
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Figure 6. Minimum Days of Confinement
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The days of confinement recommended varied by region in which the prosecutor
worked. The minimum number of days of confinement recommended was zero in each
region. See below table.
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Table 4—Minimum Days of Confinement by Region
Region

Mean Days

Maximum Days

New England
Middle Atlantic
Midwest
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific

5.22
22.94
17.81
17.37
53.81
18.93
0
26.01
25.69

90
180
365
365
1500
365
0
720
365

As indicated by the above figures, we found extremely wide heterogeneity in how
respondents resolved the exact same case. Although 18 respondents resolved the case
without pressing any charges, the modal respondent imposed two charges, and some sought
seven or more. Similarly, although many respondents sought no monetary penalty at all,
and the modal respondent who sought a monetary penalty sought $500 or less, some
demanded as much as $5,000. Most strikingly, we saw many respondents resolving the
case without any jail time, but others demanding a month, or even up to two years in one
case. And there was significant variability in the number of charges and recommended
punishment by respondents’ region.
B. Reasons for Recommendations
Beyond asking prosecutors to charge the hypothetical case, we were also interested in
why prosecutors decided to make specific recommendations. We thus asked respondents
to explain their reasoning for their charging and penalty recommendations.140 This question
was not mandatory, but many respondents chose to explain their reasoning, and we coded
the responses for common themes, presented below. The five common themes provided
for prosecutors recommendations are described in Part III.B.1 necessity of punishment
despite a minor crime; Part III.B.2 the financial state of offender; Part III.B.3 the mental
state of offender; Part III.B.4 the benefit of jail time for offender; and Part III.B.5 plea
bargaining considerations.
1. Necessity of Punishment, Despite Minor Crime
A large group of prosecutors recommended punishment for defendant, despite their
recognition that this was a minor crime. Nearly half of respondents (230) observed that the
crime was relatively minor. Many respondents described the conduct using phrases like
“No big deal,” “Relatively minor offenses,” and “The crime is de minimus, and no one was
140

Respondents were directed to “Please write a couple of sentences explaining your decision
in the scenario that you reviewed.”
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harmed.” Such respondents framed the offender’s conduct as part of a “bad day” that
resulted in no consequential harm and did not view the defendant as a threat to public safety
or likely to reoffend.
Despite understanding the crime to be minor, more than half of these respondents
(115) still recommended some sort of penalty. Respondents who felt that some punishment
was warranted despite the lack of harm tended to use a monetary penalty instead of
confinement (82 recommended imposing a fine or court costs, and of this group, eight
mentioned that community service could be used to pay the monetary penalty).141
Respondents who only imposed a monetary penalty focused on wanting to deter future
bad conduct, but noted that jail was not warranted given that there was no public threat and
that incarceration would be harmful to the offender. A junior prosecutor in the Mountain
region who recommended a $600 monetary penalty and no jail time wrote, “While some
punishment may be necessary, such as a fine, in order to deter the Defendant from
committing the same acts under similar circumstances, I don’t think jail would be
beneficial for anyone in this case.” Similarly, a junior prosecutor from the Pacific region
who recommended a $100 fine explained: “I believe in this case a minimal monetary
sanction with a suspended sentence would get the point across . . . that his behavior is not
appropriate, but would also not blow the situation/incident out of proportion.” A midcareer
prosecutor from the South Atlantic region respondent who recommended probation and a
fine between $350–$500 wrote, “I want something that takes it seriously that a person is
possibly drunk and wielding a weapon but also an opportunity to take responsibility
without facing the worst sentence.”
Some monetary penalty recommendations were more severe, however. A prosecutor
from the Pacific region with 20 years experience who recommended a $2,500 fine wrote,
“There needs to be some accountability, but no one was actually injured and I think the
negative impact of a felony or a jail sentence is disproportionate to the harm imposed by
the defendant’s actions in this case. I think a large fine and suspended sentence are
appropriate.”
Some respondents appeared to impose a fine to further different criminal justice
purposes, such as increasing funding for law enforcement. A junior prosecutor from the
Mountain region who recommended only $100 fine wrote, “I don’t believe he needs to be
incarcerated. The fines go towards furthering police work and programs that help people
with behavioral health issues.”
Some respondents offered evidence-based reasons for recommending a monetary
penalty instead of jail time. A junior prosecutor from the Midwest who recommended a
$500 fine plus court costs argued, “Additionally studies show that jail for someone who is
low risk like this defendant could actually do more damage by exposing him to high risk
individuals or jeopardizing his career through the period of incarceration.” A Midwest
prosecutor with almost 30 years of experience who recommended only $100 fine plus court
141
Seven respondents chose to recommend only a term of confinement, and 26 recommended
both a term of confinement and a monetary penalty. One respondent who recommended two days
in jail and a $500 fine plus court costs wrote, “People make mistakes. No one was hurt, and this man
doesn’t appear to need to be locked away for life based on one bad day. The goal is to make it sting
a bit, and give him the tools to make that behavior obsolete so he doesn’t re-offend.”
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costs observed, “Evidence based decision making informs us that low risk offenders tend
to be self correcting and that placing them on probation and /or incarcerating them will do
more harm than good. I prefer to defer him in a First Offender program if possible, and if
not a monetary fine should be sufficient retribution.”
Many did not view any punishment as necessary, however. A midcareer prosecutor
from the Mountain region wrote, “I would decline to prosecute … because I do not feel
that he is a danger to the community, nor do I believe this would be a good use of resources.
Just because acts fit the definition of a crime does not mandate that a person be prosecuted.
This is why prosecutors have discretion.” A midcareer New England prosecutor wrote, “I
do believe that this conduct is properly classified as criminal, but it is pretty minor, and he
has no record, so the proverbial ‘slap on the wrist is appropriate.” An experienced
prosecutor from the Mountain region described their reasoning for no punitive sanctions as
follows: “I considered the social harm (low) of the offense and the ascertainable risk of
future crime (low). I also considered the seriousness of the crime category (low). I
concluded that the suspect would be a good candidate for a diversion or “deferred
prosecution.” A midcareer prosecutor from the South Atlantic region similarly noted, “First
time offender, there’s nothing that incarceration can do on this case that probation can’t.”
Several respondents mentioned rehabilitation as a motivation for not imposing
punishment and wanted to connect the offender to additional resources like anger
management counseling, conflict resolution courses, substance abuse treatment, and
mental health treatment. Still mindful of the negative impact on the victim of the crime, a
junior prosecutor in the Mountain region who recommended no punishment wrote, “I
included the letter of apology to give [Defendant] an opportunity to express any remorse
he has over his behavior as well as to provide a way for the named victim to feel her distress
was acknowledged and also so she is aware the judicial system responded to this situation.”
Overall, a large number of prosecutors deemed this crime to be a minor one, although
at least half of them still imposed a monetary penalty or jail time.
2. Considering the Financial State of Offender
A subset of prosecutors specifically noted the financial state of the offender, and
considered this in their decision to charge. Many respondents (58) explicitly considered the
financial state of the offender when recommending punishment. Often, monetary penalties
were not imposed because, given the scenario presented, respondents did not believe that
the offender would be able to pay. Some still felt that some sort of community restitution
was necessary, and so recommended community service in lieu of a monetary penalty. As
a junior prosecutor from the South Atlantic region observed, “I would not ask for a
monetary penalty because if he cannot afford a train ticket, he likely cannot afford a
monetary penalty.” This respondent recommended 10 hours of community service in lieu
of a fine. A junior prosecutor from the Mountain region who also recommended
community service in lieu of a monetary penalty because of the defendant’s inability to
pay wrote, “Given that he was asking for money, it did not seem practical, or indeed useful
to require a fine. Instead, I would ask for something that would benefit the community—
that being community service.”
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Given the offender’s perceived inability to pay a monetary penalty, several
respondents thought imposing one may be too burdensome. One such respondent, a head
prosecutor in the Mountain region with three years of experience, wrote that they would
not impose a monetary penalty because “He would just be back in jail for not paying fines
which exceeds the scope of conduct that we should be punishing here.”
Some who thought the monetary penalty would be too burdensome recommended
connecting the offender to social services. A Midwest junior prosecutor noted that given
that “He was desperate for money, [monetary penalties] would not seem to do any good,
but to make the problem worse” and recommended probation and treatment. A midcareer
prosecutor from the Mountain region recommended connecting the offender to “housing
support and job skills along with possible substance abuse counseling and treatment”
combined with supervision in lieu of a monetary penalty given the offender’s perceived
lack of means to pay.
Some respondents who recognized that a monetary penalty would be too burdensome
for the offender instead opted for imposing a term of confinement; that is, they substituted
jail for a fine. One South Atlantic prosecutor with over 20 years of experience observed
that “A fine would be onerous” given that the offender had no money. In order to address
the fact that the alleged conduct upset the public, however, this respondent recommended
10 days of confinement. This prosecutor failed to recognize the costs of 10 days of
confinement would likely be more than a monetary penalty given that defendant was
employed.142
Other respondents who recognized that the offender may not be able to afford a fine
still imposed a monetary penalty, but seemed to reduce the amount they would normally
recommend. One such respondent, a Midwest head prosecutor with three years of
experience, stated, “I only asked for $500.00 because from the fact scenario it sounded like
money is an issue for this person. I utilize the phrase ‘You can’t squeeze blood from a
turnip’ in cases like this.” A midcareer prosecutor from the Mountain region observed, “It
does not seem like he has much money which is why a $350 fine will still be a stiff penalty
without being unfairly burdensome.” A junior Midwest prosecutor who recommended a
fine of up to $500 wrote, “It seems like this is a mental health/poverty issue rather than
there being any real criminal intent.”
Some respondents also focused on the offender’s employment status to justify
imposition of a monetary penalty. One midcareer Midwest prosecutor recommended a
$500 monetary penalty and wrote, “The defendant is gainfully employed with no prior
record and can afford to pay a fine.” Another respondent similarly justified a $1,000 fine.
One respondent wanted more information about the offender’s financial state prior to
making a recommendation about imposing a monetary penalty. This experienced
prosecutor from the South Atlantic region wrote, “I would actually want more information
about his. Is he employed? Would a fine set him up for a violation because of an inability
to pay? I think that it is reasonable to levy a monetary sanction but inability to pay cannot
be ignored in my evaluation.”
142

Shima Baradaran Baughman, Costs of Pretrial Detention, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2017)
(“[T]he value of lost freedom to pretrial detainees may be as high as $6,770 for the least dangerous
defendants.”).
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In sum, there was significant variability amongst respondents considering the
financial state of the offender in terms of what they recommended. Overall, prosecutors
seemed to try to tailor their punishments to what they deemed was affordable for defendant,
although some imposed jail time even though that could be much more costly in the long
run.
3. Mental Health Considerations
It was common for respondents to consider the defendant’s mental or emotional
health, as well as potential substance abuse. Many respondents, assuming no prior criminal
history, recommended mental health assessments because they viewed this as the cause of
the alleged behavior, and several mentioned diversion to mental health court. 147
respondents (27.12%) mentioned mental health when explaining their reasoning for
imposing (or not) a monetary penalty or term of confinement. 46 other respondents (8.49%)
mentioned counseling or treatment. 29 other respondents (4.06%) mentioned anger
management. In all, 222 respondents (40.96%) considered the mental health or emotional
needs of the defendant.
Many respondents concerned about the offender’s mental health opted for no
punishment. As one head prosecutor with three years of experience in the West North
Central region wrote, “While the defendant’s behavior meets the technical requirements of
the crimes marked, it appears that his behavior may be resulting from either a mental health
or anger management issue. Therefore, my primary motivation is correct the problem,
rather than to simply seek punishment. This is especially true of a first-time offender. If
the defendant is willing to participate in a mental health screening and any treatment
recommended by the screening, that will most likely do more to ensure the safety of the
community than will a fine or a jail sentence.”
The lack of physical harm was also often paired with concerns about the offender’s
mental health to justify no negative sanctions. One head prosecutor with ten years of
experience in the Mountain region conveyed, “[Defendant]’s behavior appears to be the
result an acute mental disorder or emotional disturbance. It makes sense to me to provide
him with an incentive to address the underlying issues. Had anyone been injured by his
behavior my analysis would be different.”
Several respondents who did not impose a term of confinement or a monetary penalty
recognized that the offender needed additional help. One head prosecutor with almost 30
years of experience in the West North Central region observed, “This appears to be a
troubled person with needs beyond the criminal justice system.”
Others who recommended no punishment wanted to connect the offender to services
necessary for rehabilitation. One head prosecutor with five years of experience in the West
North Central region who sought no punishment recommended “drug/alcohol examination
and/or a mental health examination with follow-up treatment as recommended, as that
seems to be the root cause of the situation.”143 An experienced Midwest prosecutor who
likewise did not recommend a term of confinement or a monetary penalty wrote, “If the
143

The same prosecutor also noted that “[i]f the defendant had a long history of this sort of
behavior, my recommendation would be different.”
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man has no criminal history, it would appear that this is a mental health issue. I would like
to put him on probation and order treatment.”
Sometimes respondents thought that the prospect of future punishment was necessary
to facilitate mental health treatment. One head prosecutor in the Midwest region with 16
years of experience who recommended no punishment wrote, “Appears to be a mental
health incident. I would be satisfied with a stick (or carrot) to coerce him to receive some
mental health services.” A midcareer Midwest prosecutor who recommended suspended
confinement and a fine wrote, “I would recommended probation (suspended sentence)
based on the apparent rehabilitative needs; specifically alcohol treatment, mental health
treatment, and anger management. It is premature to impose jail, however, should he fail
on probation or reject probation, I would recommend a jail sentence.” A head prosecutor
with three years of experience in the Pacific region who recommended a suspended jail
sentence wrote, “Best thing for community safety is for him to get the help he needs. Jail
hanging over his head provides an incentive for him to get into treatment.”
Some respondents focused on balancing need for mental health treatment with
punishment. A junior prosecutor in the South Atlantic region who recommended a
suspended sentence of 200 days in jail wrote, “To me justice in this situation is a balance
between punishing the defendant for the disruption of peace and preventing the defendant
from reoffending by ensuring that he receives the substance abuse treatment and potential
mental health treatment that he needs.”
Despite the mental health issues latent in the vignette, not all respondents who
recognized that the incident could have been caused by mental health problems opted not
to impose a punishment. Of these 222 respondents, 12 recommended a term of
confinement, 10 recommended a monetary penalty, and six recommended both.144 Some
respondents concerned about the mental health status of the offender recommended only a
fine. One very junior prosecutor in the South Atlantic region recommended a $750 fine and
wrote, “They were not in danger of being injured. This is more than likely a mental health
issue or a one time occurrence triggered by the issue with his girlfriend.” Another junior
South Atlantic prosecutor recommended a $500 fine and wrote, “This sounds likely to be
a mental health related or possibly substance abuse related. A 29 year old with no previous
criminal history exhibiting this kind of behavior would likely benefit from some kind of
treatment significantly more than confinement or excessive fines.” A midcareer South
Atlantic prosecutor recommended diverting the offender to mental health court and
imposing a $250-$500 fine, writing, “evidence that this episode may have been exacerbated
by alcohol and/or mental health issues which would be treatable, preventing future violence
and obviating the need for incarceration to keep the community safe.”
Some respondents thought that a term of confinement was appropriate despite
evidence of mental health issues, focusing on the need for accountability. An experienced
South Atlantic prosecutor who recommended 10 days in jail and a $750 fine wrote, “It
sounds like a mental health issue. The sentence will have conditions that require a mental
health evaluation. His lack of criminal history played into my decision to go low on
144

Five respondents recommended community service in lieu of confinement or a monetary
penalty, and two recommended the offender be mandated to receive counseling in lieu of
punishment.
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confinement, but because he did pose a threat to the woman, he should be punished with
some period of incarceration.” A Middle Atlantic prosecutor with over 25 years of
experience who recommended up to four months in jail and a $750 fine wrote, “I would
seek 4 months in jail. However, if the defendant sought counseling etc., and had no further
arrests while the case is pending, I’d consider a lesser jail sentence. While the defendant
might have mental health issues, he also created a dangerous situation in which the public
felt obliged to flee from a public place for their own safety.” An experienced Midwest
prosecutor who recommended four days in jail along with a $500 fine wrote, “My main
concern with this scenario is to make sure there was some accountability for the suspect’s
actions but it appears there may be some underlying emotional or mental health issues that
need to be addressed. I would see if there could be a referral for a mental health exam.”
Other respondents seeking a term of confinement focused on the presence of a knife.
A junior prosecutor in the South Atlantic region who recommended a year in jail stated,
“But for the knife he would have likely received a term of probation with a condition of
seeking mental health treatment.” An experienced Midwest prosecutor recommended a 65day term of confinement in a psychiatric facility, five years of probation, and a $500 fine
and asserted, “He needs evaluation and treatment, but needs to learn consequences of
actions, he caused public fear to several people and was willing to touch another and
brandish a knife.”
Some only recommended a short period of confinement in order to ensure that there
was sufficient time to conduct a mental health assessment. A midcareer Midwest
prosecutor who recommended two days in jail along with a $200 fine wrote, “The 2 day
time period is really just to ensure that the person can be assessed by community mental
health to see if treatment is necessary before release.”
Further, some respondents considered the mental health of the offender and concluded
that there was no mental illness and that punishment was thus appropriate. An experienced
head prosecutor in the Mountain region recommended 180 days in jail and noted, “This
person does not appear to suffer from a cognizable mental illness to further mitigate or
offer a basis for some kind of diversion. Therefor some incarceration would be appropriate
followed by a probationary period to ensure the defendant’s continued lawfulness.”
Respondents who considered mental health varied not only in what types of
punishment they recommended, but also in their perception of the offender’s danger to the
community. A midcareer prosecutor in the West North Central region who recommended
only a mental health evaluation wrote, “There is nothing to indicate he would need to be
incarcerated for . . . the safety of the community.” While an experienced head prosecutor
from the South Atlantic region who imposed a $500 fine and two years of probation wrote,
“He needs mental help but he’s clearly a danger to the community.” Some viewed the
offender as more of a danger to himself than society. A junior prosecutor in the East South
Central region recommended that “[Defendant have] an opportunity to rehabilitate himself,
eg participate in AA or some other court approved drug and alcohol program, and any
psychiatric referral” because “Due to any lack of intent to harm others (I saw him more
likely to harm himself), I would much rather see someone given a chance and assistance
than pop them with a charge even a misdemeanor who is employed and allow him to be
contributing society member.”
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Overall, a large number of prosecutors noted mental health concerns in their charging
decisions, and those who noted such concerns largely decided not to impose jail time or a
monetary fine. However, some prosecutors imposed jail time and monetary penalties
despite recognizing potential mental health issues.
4. Using Jail to Teach a Lesson
The vast majority of respondents did not think confinement was appropriate, and those
who did recommend a term of confinement tended to recommend under 30 days in jail,
with most opting to impose fewer than 10 days. When explaining their recommendations
for seeking a term of confinement, many respondents (45/145) explicitly indicated that a
short stay in jail was warranted to teach defendant a lesson.145
Some respondents focused on using jail to teach a lesson. One head prosecutor with
over 30 years of experience in the West North Central region who recommended the
offender serve two days in jail and pay $1,000 fine wrote, “Potentially serious
consequences of his stupidity but lucky this time - no one hurt - and no record; 2 days in
jail lets him see what jail is like and why he needs a smarter game plan in the future to
avoid getting in trouble.” A midcareer prosecutor in the Midwest who recommended two
days in jail along with a $200 fine wrote that they wanted to “impress upon the suspect the
inappropriateness of the conduct, without unduly penalizing the individual.” An
experienced head prosecutor from the West South Central region recommended up to three
days in jail and a $500 fine and observed, “People make mistakes. No one was hurt, and
this man doesn’t appear to need to be locked away for life based on one bad day. The goal
is to make it sting a bit, and give him the tools to make that behavior obsolete so he doesn’t
re-offend.”
An experienced prosecutor in the West North Central region who recommended four
days in jail along with a $200 monetary penalty noted, “The four days is to remind him that
he really screwed up and scared people.” A prosecutor in the Pacific region with 20 years
of experience recommended five days in jail and stated that, “While the action alarmed
people, no physical harm was done. Def[endant] has no record, and was upset. I would
treat this as a first time offense with 5 days to hold him accountable for people alarmed.”
A junior prosecutor in the South Atlantic region who recommended 10 days in jail along
with a $500 fine justified their decision as follows: “However, displaying a knife in a
crowded public place could have lead to disastrous results. If someone in the station had a
gun they could have started shooting and people could have been seriously injured; so some
jail time is necessary to make him understand the seriousness of his actions. However,
given that he cooperated with police, immediately handing over the knife, and never
actually brandished the knife at anyone, I do not feel that an excessive amount of jail time
is necessary. Just enough time to make him think.”
Some respondents who thought a short stay in jail would teach the defendant a lesson
recommended a term of confinement that was more severe than others. A junior prosecutor
in the Pacific region recommended 60 days in jail and wrote, “As for consequences, I find
145

Others thought lengthier jail sentences were warranted given that a knife was present, which
posed a significant danger to the public.
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this serious as he used a deadly weapon to scare multiple people and even went so far to
grab a woman’s arm. . . . But, these facts are mitigated by no criminal history even after
being 18 for 10 years, cooperative with police officers, no physical injuries, and no pointing
the knife at any person. So, some actual jail time to impart seriousness of his conduct but
minimal with hope that those 60 days will scare him straight.”
Other respondents seemed to use jail as a lesson both for the defendant and others in
hopes of a deterrent effect. A head prosecutor with 1.5 years of experience in the Mountain
region who recommended 10 days of confinement and a $1,000 monetary penalty asserted
that, “The knife and assault are both significant factors to me. People were literally
endangered by the actions of Mr. [Johnson] and that kind of behavior, though apparently
the first time Mr. Johnson exhibited such behavior, deserves a strong message: If you
commit a felony that literally endangers the lives of others, the State takes those actions
seriously.” Similarly, a midcareer head prosecutor in the West North Central region who
recommended 30 days in jail plus a $500 fine reasoned, “I don’t believe a severe penalty
is warranted . . . [but] there needs to be sufficient response to deter others from committing
similar acts and for the public to have confidence that people who cause these kinds of
disturbances will be dealt with appropriately.” A junior prosecutor in the Mountain region
who recommended 30 days of confinement plus an unspecified fine wrote, “This case
presents a public safety issue that I believe would require a jail sentence to send a message
to the community that this is the type of behavior we as a society will not tolerate.” Others,
however, thought that confinement was inappropriate given no evidence of a prior criminal
record and the cost of confinement. An experienced head prosecutor in the South Atlantic
region wrote, “A sentence of confinement also does not serve justice as this defendant has
no prior record and the taxpayer would be bearing the ultimate burden.”
Overall, a surprisingly large number of prosecutors opted to chose jail time as a tool
to teach defendant a lesson, although others did this to deter others from similar behavior.
5. Plea Bargaining Motivations and Strategies
Plea negotiations were mentioned by 71 respondents when explaining their charging
decisions and punishment recommendations. Respondents were thinking about a variety of
factors when discussing pleas including dropping charges as a plea negotiation tool,
building a criminal history, leaving room for victim input, or pressing charges to
incentivize mental health or other treatment.
Some were considering the defendant’s possible future criminal offenses and building
a history. A head prosecutor with five years of experience in the West North Central region
such who recommended a suspended sentence and no monetary penalty stated, “I would .
. . try to get a plea to the felony (at the expense of dismissing the misdemeanors), as that
would enhance the criminal history score in the future were there to be another incident.”
Other respondents who were considering possible future criminal offenses were
willing to offer a plea to a lesser charge if the defendant could stay out of trouble for a
period of time. One prosecutor in the Moutain region with 20 years of experience who
recommended a suspended sentence and a year of probation commended, “I would charge
the disorderly conduct, one count, for the disruption of the train station’s activity and for
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frightening people, and offer him a misdemeanor resolution if he can stay out of trouble
for 12 months.”
Other respondents were oriented more toward the defendant’s past (lack of) criminal
history when considering plea deals. A junior prosecutor from the West North Central
region who would charge disorderly conduct and assault and recommended a suspended
sentence and no fine wrote, “I’d probably dismiss one through plea negotiations due to the
defendant’s lack of history.”
Several respondents wanted to make plea decisions based on the victim’s input. An
experienced prosecutor in the South Atlantic region who recommended a $1,000 penalty
wrote, “I would charge the felony but, if the victim consents, be willing to let the defendant
plea to a misdemeanor.” Another prosecutor in the South Atlantic region with over 30 years
of experience who recommended a $500 fine wrote, “I would also consult with the woman
he grabbed . . . to get her input and explain both my charging decision and recommendation
on a plea.” A Midwest prosecutor with over 25 years of experience who recommended no
confinement and a suspended fine wrote, “This is merely a charging decision fitting the
facts. I’d certainly be willing to bargain it down (depending on what the victim says). And
an experienced head prosecutor in the Mountain region who recommended 10–20 days of
confinement emphasized that the victim’s consent was necessary to offering a plea to lesser
charges, remarking, “The knife is the most concerning part of this episode, so we start with
the felonies, probably plead it to matching misdemeanors due to his criminal history IF
victim agrees.”
Some respondents who would charge a felony but later reduce the charge through plea
negotiations focused on what type of charge they could prove. A midcareer prosecutor in
the South Atlantic region who recommended a suspended sentence observed, “Of all the
permissible charges, I found the most appropriate to be Disorderly Conduct, RCS
101(A)(3). Although this is a felony with a 6-month minimum, the defendant’s conduct in
brandishing is the most easily provable charge given the provable evidence. I felt there was
insufficient evidence to prove Harassment, Endangerment, Criminal Nuisance, Aggravated
Assault, and Loitering. In fact, I believe Assault would even be difficult to prove in light
of the intent required, and I did not believe that there would be sufficient witnesses for
Public Nuisance. Thus, I would charge the felony Disorderly Conduct and likely reduce it
to the misdemeanor Disorderly Conduct with a suspended jail and monetary sentence.”
Some respondents used plea bargaining as an incentive for the offender to obtain
necessary social and behavioral services. A junior New England prosecutor who
recommended a suspended sentence stated, “This is an individual who, under an emotional
circumstance, made a bad decision that scared individuals around him. I would charge him
with disorderly conduct, with the intent that he comply with treatment--either anger
management or other therapy. Depending on his demeanor and level of remorse, I may also
require him to complete some community service. If compliant, I would likely drop the
case.”
Others noted that flexibility in the plea negotiation process best served justice. Many
respondents would bring multiple charges or charge a felony in order to get the offender to
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plea to fewer or lesser charges in the process of negotiating a plea.146 One midcareer
prosecutor in the South Atlantic region who recommended a fine between $250–$500
observed, “By bringing three charges of varying degrees, we can ultimately make the plea
recommendation/offer that best serves the interests of justice in a particular case. For
instance, we can later dismiss the felony and proceed on the two misdemeanors if that’s
what is appropriate. Or plea to the felony and merge in the misdemeanors if that’s
appropriate.” A junior prosecutor in the Mountain region who recommended a suspended
sentence and $500 fine stated, “When I screen for charges, I usually charge the maximum
charges that I can and then in resolving the case a lot of it will depend and input from the
victim and also how the defendant willingness to accept responsibility in regards to his
actions and whether or not they have taken any steps before hand to address the issue.”
And a New England head prosecutor with over 30 years of experience who recommended
90 days in jail noted, “Despite being able to articulate a felony would work to get a
misdemeanor plea as that represents the best balance of the public interest--a sanction
which both punishes and has specific and general deterrence and a means of responding to
further bad conduct (suspended sentences). No monetary fine. Not a fan of financial
penalties--for those with means-largely meaningless--for those without means do not pay
and ends up being largely meaningless.”
Some respondents felt that prosecutors should bring more serious charges first to
provide flexibility later, although they often noted that they did not think felony charges
were warranted. An experienced prosecutor in the Pacific region who recommended a
suspended sentence and no fine wrote, “In general, find the most serious charge for which
there is evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. It is far easier to plea bargain down to reach
a result consistent with justice than it is to seek higher charges down the road.” Similarly,
a prosecutor with over 20 years of experience in the East South Central region who
recommended a suspended sentence and a $500 fine per charge asserted, “A person should
generally be charged with the most serious offense possible under the applicable laws and
fact scenario. A part of being a good prosecutor, in my opinion, is having the wisdom and
good judgment to know when to be harsh and when to be lenient. It is much easier to allow
a plea to a lesser offense and more lenient sentence than the other way. Bottom line . . .
you can always come down when warranted but you can’t go up.” An experienced
prosecutor in the West North Central region who did not recommend any punishment
wrote, “Filing felony gives room to negotiate down to misdemeanor.” A midcareer South
Atlantic prosecutor who recommended two years of probation and a $1,000 fine wrote, “I
would charge all if not several of the offenses in order to have charges to dismiss in the
negotiation of the plea. I also tend to overcharge, because I can’t add charges later, but I
can dismiss charges any time.”
146

Several respondents specifically mentioned charging with the intent of dropping some
charges or reducing the severity of the charges in negotiation with the defendant and the defense
attorney. 29 respondents stated that they would charge a felony but allow the defendant to plead to
a misdemeanor. Three respondents would select multiple charges but offer a plea to one felony
charge in favor of dropping additional misdemeanor charges. Five respondents would charge
multiple misdemeanors but allow the defendant to plead to a single misdemeanor charge. Ten
respondents indicated that they would charge multiple counts at various levels in order to expand
plea options.
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Others thought that bringing multiple charges was a waste of time, however. One
junior Midwest prosecutor who recommended a year in jail wrote, “I am charging the
felonious assault and the lesser included misdemeanor assault. It is a waste of time to
charge the nonassaultive charges because they would likely be dismissed anyway as part
of a plea deal.”
Still other respondents felt that more serious charges should only be brought if the
defendant was uncooperative in the process of plea negotiations. An experienced Midwest
prosecutor who recommended a suspended sentence and suspended fine wrote, “I would
charge the minimum charge necessary to get the goal desired, that being probation (or
suspended sentence). If the defendant would not accept that plea and sentence, then I would
most likely dismiss the case and reissue it with all the charges that apply, including the
felony for recklessly displaying the knife.” A midcareer prosecutor in the Midwest region
who recommended a suspended sentence and probation wrote, “I would charge him with
disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor level. In making that decision, although noting that his
conduct could properly fit a felony disorderly conduct (while armed with a dangerous
weapon), I also take into consideration his lack of prior record, his cooperation and deescalation of the situation when law enforcement arrived, and his motivation for conducting
himself in this manner. . . . I would be seeking probation (a suspended sentence) to
determine if any mental health or substance abuse issues existed. . . . Should this defendant
choose to take this case to trial, however, I would likely re-file the case with at least one
felony count, as it would indicate to me that he has no interest in taking accountability for
his actions and is not likely to self-correct in the future.” A junior Midwest prosecutor who
recommended a suspended sentence wrote, “Only charging Assault and Battery would be
my initial charge, but if defendant was not willing to plea on that count and insisted on a
trial, there would likely be more charges at trial - any charges supported by the evidence
necessarily presented regarding the Assault and Battery.”
Overall, many prosecutors reported filing charges against defendant without the desire
to have defendant serve that time, but to use charges as a negotiation tool or to build a
criminal history.
C. General Decision-Making Process
After the respondents answered questions about the vignette, we then asked
respondents about how prosecutors in their office make charging decisions. We asked who
makes the charging decision, whether the crime is a felony or misdemeanor changes the
decision-making process, who prosecutes the case after decisions are made about charging,
and whether their office has internal guidelines or standards governing charging decisions.
We present their responses to these survey questions as well as qualitative analysis of any
additional comments they provided below. Notably, the vast majority of prosecutors (72%)
made charging and plea bargaining decisions alone, and the majority (57%) even
prosecuted the cases without any input from another prosecutor.
1. Responsibility for Charging/Plea Bargaining Decisions and Prosecution
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We were interested in knowing about prosecutors’ charging and plea-bargaining
process. We asked respondents about how “the decision as to charging and plea bargaining
[would] be made in [their] office.” The vast majority, 72.46% of respondents (392),
indicated that a front-line prosecutor would make the decision alone. 12.01% of
respondents (65) indicated that a front-line prosecutor would make the decision after
consulting with a superior. 1.29% of respondents (7) indicated that a front-line prosecutor
would advise a superior and he or she would make the decision. One respondent (.18% of
respondents) indicated that a committee or board of prosecutors would make a collective
decision without the front-line prosecutor involved. Two respondents (.37% of
respondents) indicated that a committee or board of prosecutors would make a collective
decision with the front-line prosecutor involved. 13.68% (74) selected other, of which 15
respondents indicated that the police make the initial charging decision in their jurisdiction
and six respondents were the only prosecutor in their office.
We next asked respondents whether “the screening process change[s] if the crime is a
felony rather than a misdemeanor?” 29.63% of respondents (160) said yes, and 70.37% of
respondents (380) said no.
Finally, we asked respondents “After the initial charging decision is made, what
happens to the case?” 27.22% of respondents (147) indicated that the case is assigned to
another attorney who has discretion to change the charges. 1.67% of respondents (9)
indicated that the case is assigned to another attorney who does not have discretion to
change the charges. 57.22% of respondents (309) indicated that the attorney who makes
the charging decision prosecutes the case. 13.89% of respondents (75) selected other. Of
the respondents who selected other, 33 explained that the case is reassigned to a prosecutor
who has at least partial discretion over the charges.
In sum, our study revealed that prosecutors typically acted alone in charging and
prosecuting the cases that came before them.
2. Internal Guidelines or Standards
Slightly over half of prosecutors we surveyed had internal guidelines they were able
to follow in making charging decisions. Specifically we asked respondents whether their
“office [has] internal guidelines or standards that dictate how prosecutors make charging
decisions?” 8.74% of respondents (47) indicated that their office has mandatory internal
guidelines or standards that prosecutors must follow when making charging decisions.
45.35% of respondents (244) indicated that their office has internal guidelines or standards
that prosecutors should consider when making charging decisions, but following them is
not necessary. 45.91% of respondents (247) indicated that their office does not have
internal guidelines or standards and each prosecutor decides based on their best judgment.
Overall, most prosecutors had some guidelines, (though 45.9% had no guidelines at all)
and those who did, only a small number (8.7%) indicated that they were mandatory.
We then asked respondents, “If your office has internal guidelines or standards, what
do they state in regards to charging?” 30 respondents referenced ABA standards (either
explicitly or by listing the standards), 20 referenced NDAA standards (either explicitly or
by listing the standards), 44 referenced “reasonable likelihood of success at trial/reasonable
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likelihood of conviction,” 49 referenced “beyond a reasonable doubt,” and 18 mentioned
“probable cause.”
Some respondents conveyed that they had office policies, but declined to provide
them. For some who declined to provide their office guidelines, the reason was that it was
impracticable to do so because of length. One representative comment from a head
prosecutor with three years of experience in the Pacific region was, “Too long to
summarize here.”Others offered only generalities about their office policies because they
were proprietary. One experienced Midwest prosecutor stated, “Proprietary. Generally, we
make these decisions considering the history, mental health, prior criminal justice contacts,
wishes of the victims (if any), whether there was use of the dangerous weapon, any
injuries.”
In sum, though internal guidance exists for prosecutors it was rarely mandatory, nor
did the majority of offices provide specific guidance on severity or uniformity of charging.
The remainder of this Part, subsections a, b, and c, will describe common themes from
responses about what guidelines and standards govern prosecutor decision making.
(a) Guidelines and Discretion
Several respondents mentioned that their guidelines varied by type of crime. One
midcareer prosecutor in the South Atlantic region noted that their office has “a grid that
determines charging and punishment.” A head prosecutor with one year of experience in
the Mountain region wrote, “Our standards are specific to types of crimes. For example,
domestic violence, sexual assault and child endangerment are always charged as initially
reported by the victim or witness. Nonviolent felonies may be considered for deferral prior
to charging. The charging decision on most misdemeanors and infractions are left to the
discretion of the law enforcement officer who handled the report or investigation.” An
experienced Midwest prosecutor stated, “We only have policies/guidelines related to
certain types of cases when certain facts are present that dictate how we should charge.
Otherwise, charging is up to each individual prosecutor based on each individual case and
facts.” Other respondents gave very detailed descriptions of their standards and how they
varied by crimes.
Others noted that while they did have guidelines for some types of crimes, they did
not have guidelines for every type of crime. For example, a midcareer prosecutor in the
Pacific region conveyed, “We do not have policies for every single crime, and I believe it
would be impossible to establish rigid guidelines for all charging decisions given all of the
factors involved in a criminal case. But we do have guidelines regarding certain types of
cases. For example, certain types of felony drug possession cases are generally charged as
misdemeanors if an individual has a clean record.” A junior prosecutor in the Mountain
region stated, “There are few such guidelines. They mostly are tied to specific types of
cases i.e. domestic violence or DUI. However, we have an open door policy and you must
be able to defend your decisions and are expected to get feedback when in doubt.” An
experienced Midwest prosecutor wrote, “Standards are in place for particular crimes such
as assaults, drunk driving and sexual offenses involving children. Otherwise the charging
attorney has discretion to decide as to the appropriate charge and possible plea resolution.”
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Others noted that while they have guidelines, prosecutors have discretion to vary from
them. A head prosecutor with 30 years of experience in the Mountain region commented,
“We have a charging manual, but most of our prosecutors are aware of how we do things
and the younger prosecutors are trained by the more experienced prosecutors and often go
to the more experienced attorneys for advice. We give our prosecutors a lot of discretion.”
An experienced Midwest prosecutor wrote, “They are charge specific and just guidelines.”
A head New England prosecutor with over 30 years of experience stated, “There is a
prosecutor desk book that essentially affords prosecutors discretion in charging that varies
with the offense, history of the defendant, victim's input, cooperation and willingness of
the defendant to cooperate with programs and services offered. We try to distinguish
between those who are dangerous and/or have victimized others and are likely to do so
again and those who need services and direction.” A junior prosecutor in the South Atlantic
region characterized their office guidelines as “more of a tool and benchmark to go off of
on the average case.”
Others noted that their only guideline was to follow relevant state statutes, and beyond
this, they had discretion in charging decisions. An experienced Midwest prosecutor
commented, “It is discretionary for the charging prosecutor unless mandated by statute.”
Similarly, a Midwest prosecutor with over 25 years of experience stated, “We are to
comply with statutory victim rights.” A head prosecutor with 25 years of experience in the
South Atlantic region stated, “There are certain offenses for which a minimum sentence is
statutorily mandated. The prosecutor must, of course, follow the law, but can work around
mandatory minimums by agreeing to reduce the charges.” And one experienced Midwest
prosecutor stated that their “standards mimic those in the State ethics guidelines for
prosecutors.”
In sum, prosecutors noted that guidelines were distinct for separate crimes and that
they could depart from them, as long as they followed state statutes.
(b) Standards and Discretion
Some respondents described their general office policy for making charging decisions.
One junior prosecutor in the Mountain region stated, “Screen conservatively, prosecute
aggressively. Consult with victims prior to charging. Run potentially controversial cases
by a superior.” Another Mountain region prosecutor with almost 30 years of experience
wrote, “We have guidelines that are a loose set of charging objectives in place to make ad
hoc decisions. / We must consider a person's criminal history. / Is he a frequent flyer or is
this his first entry into the criminal justice system. / Is he a 1%er, someone from whom
society needs protection, or a knucklehead exercising poor judgment, bad decision making,
or drug/alcohol induced poor decision making. / Sometimes a crime may be a felony but
we can achieve all out objectives by charging and prosecuting a misdemeanor. / These are
illustrative not exhaustive.”
Many noted that their standards were not in writing. One midcareer prosecutor in the
South Atlantic region noted, “The guidelines and standards are not written and are
otherwise informal. [B]asically we are to charge what is appropriate and not overcharge.
We are to keep in mind that any plea negotiations begin, meaning the maximum, is what
is charged and goes down from there.” A junior prosecutor in the South Atlantic region
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mentioned that the lack of a formal, written standard did not result in inconsistency because
of strong informal standards. They wrote, “We do not have any formal standards but do
often consult with other prosecutors and the District Attorney in sensitive, unique, or high
profile cases. Due to this, although we don't have any kind of sentencing grid, broadly
speaking, charging decisions are consistent from ADA to ADA.”
Several respondents offered standards that were directions to charge based on the
crime committed or the strength of the evidence. One prosecutor with over 30 years of
experience in the Pacific region stated their office policy was to “Charge the most serious
charges legally supported by the evidence.” Similarly, one Midwest prosecutor with over
30 years of experience stated, “Nothing specified. The prosecutors are told to charge the
offenses they think are appropriate, given the facts of the case.” A head prosecutor with 10
years of experience in the Mountain region wrote, “We charge the crimes committed.” A
junior prosecutor in the South Atlantic region commented, “[M]ake charging decisions
based off of warrants unless frivolous charges appear that cannot be proven.” An
experienced South Atlantic prosecutor stated, “generally, all charges supported by the facts
should be charged, however, there is more discretion in serious cases where the question
is about lesser-included counts.” A head prosecutor with 10 years of experience in the
Mountain region wrote, “Charge conservatively, taking into account any obvious defenses
and suppression issues.”
Some respondents reported guidance to avoid felony charges when possible, however.
One Midwest head prosecutor with over 20 years of experience stated, “We try to avoid
felony charges if possible based upon youth, lack of prior record, etc. We also choose
misdemeanors over felonies when the circumstances of the crime simply do not arise to
level of what are classified as "serious" crimes (felony).”
Some respondents connected their charging guidance to the plea process. Several
respondents had office policies against overcharging. An experienced prosecutor in the
Mountain region stated, “We do not charge counts just to use them for plea negotiations.
we charge based on the facts.” A midcareer Mountain prosecutor noted that, “Charging
should be done based off of the criminal statutes and charges should not be stacked for the
purposes of pleas or early disposition.” An experienced Midwest prosecutor stated, “Never
overcharge a defendant with the idea of plea bargaining later. Consult victim and police in
making a charging decision. Charge defendant fairly.” Another midcareer Midwest
prosecutor commented, “In general, our office has a policy that if a felony is charged, then
the prosecutor must seek a felony conviction. There are exceptions, of course, but in
general the idea is that we do not want to charge high just to get misdemeanor convictions
and bully our way into convictions.”
Not all standards were against overcharging, however. Some respondents noted the
need for flexibility in the plea-bargaining process. One junior prosecutor in the South
Atlantic region wrote, “My office’s policy is to take a good look at the evidence, evaluate
its strengths and weaknesses, then to reach out to witnesses to seek any clarifications
necessary. Once that is done, only the most pertinent charges are brought. For instance, if
a Defendant is charged with a serious felony offense and multiple misdemeanors, our
policy is to evaluate whether those additional misdemeanors need to be charged in light of
the substantial penalty a Defendant may face due to the felony. However, sometimes
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misdemeanor offenses will also be charged to leave room for compromise resolutions,
whether that be after trial or during the plea negotiation stage.”
Several respondents indicated that their office standards were based on fairness and
equality considerations. An experienced Midwest prosecutor noted that in their office “we
try to treat all cases equally,” and a midcareer Mountain prosecutor stated a similar
principle: “There are ethical considerations-- ensure that Defendants are treated equally if
they are similarly situated. No hard and fast rules, but common sense.” A midcareer
prosecutor in the Mountain region stated, “That we should be consistent in our approach to
types of cases, so as to discourage prosecutor-shopping.” Another midcareer Mountain
prosecutor wrote, “The general standard is to prosecute from the end result we are seeking.
In other words, we look at a case and determine what a fair outcome would be for all the
parties involved and then we make a decision of what charges to file.” An experienced
prosecutor in the West North Central region wrote that, “Generally, case must be supported
by evidence and not based on gender or race etc.” A prosecutor with 20 years of experience
in the Middle Atlantic region stated their office policy was, “Do not overcharge. Do not
consider race, sex, national origin, "political" connections, etc. Decision should be factdriven only.”
Others indicated that their standards were based on public safety and criminal history
considerations. A head prosecutor with seven years of experience in the West North Central
region commented, “Public safety is the highest priority. Consideration should be given to
the level of threat to public safety, followed by criminal history.” An experienced Midwest
prosecutor noted, “We should charge the repeater if the defendant qualifies, add the
enhancers if they are available, etc.” A junior prosecutor in the South Atlantic region stated,
“It greatly depends on the person criminal history. If the person is a convicted felon, our
office will as for some confinement time depending on the charges and the facts. If the
person does not have criminal history we can justify a lesser sentence or reduction in
criminal charges.”
Others who did not list standards or guidelines in the above categories summarized a
succinct, overarching standard or philosophy their office used. These were varied. One
midcareer prosecutor in the Mountain region offered the following standard: “Do the right
thing. Do the smart thing. Remember who you are fighting for.” A head prosecutor with
over 40 years of experience in the South Atlantic region said their standard was, “Just do
the right thing. Everything else will take care of itself.” A Midwest prosecutor with almost
30 years of experience said, “Use best judgment and do what is best for all. As a
misdemeanor, it would be a quick decision, and rarely subject to review.” A New England
head prosecutor with over 30 years of experience wrote, “Use discretion, don’t embarrass
the office.”
Other respondents provided a list of standards that do not fit neatly into the above
described categories. One head prosecutor with three years of experience in the Mountain
region wrote the following: “-defendants are citizens / -overcriminalization is a problem /
-criminal justice overlap with juvenile justice deserves special concern so the state's aims
do not conflict / -marijuana possession (no kids, not in school zones, not for delivery) is
NOT a major concern / -protect the public -- especially crimes of violence / -prosecute
elder abuse.”
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Prosecutors listed various different standards like conservatively screening cases,
consulting with victims, and running controversial cases by superiors, and some also noted
that standards were not in writing. Many prosecutors focused on public safety and criminal
history considerations, along with fairness and equality. Others were focused on flexibility
in charging and some noted overcharging as a problem.
(c) Supervision and Discretion
Several respondents reported needing to consult with a supervisor, and one junior
prosecutor in the South Atlantic region reported that “If a newer ADA, charging decisions
would be verified/approved by the intake supervising ADA.” A midcareer Mountain
prosecutor reported, “Any case that is or has the potential to be in the news must be cleared
with administration first.”
One elected West North Central prosecutor with over 30 years of experience wrote
that their judgment was the office’s standard. “Our office is relatively small, with six
prosecutors. As the elected District Attorney, I closely monitor charging decisions and let
my Assistants know if I disapprove of them. I guess you might say I am the internal
guideline and standard. I give my Assistants broad discretion and try not to micro-manage
them. But I do let them know if I want a certain situation handled in a particular manner,
and if they undercharged or overcharged a criminal situation.”
3. Information Important for Decision Making
We also asked prosecutors about what information is necessary for them to make
charging decisions. We asked “Which of the following pieces of information do you need
in order to make a charging decision?” and provided respondents 28 pieces of information.
See Figure 7 to see what pieces of information were important to respondents. The most
commonly selected answers (at least 75% of respondents selected) included: severity of
personal injuries, use of weapons, severity of property damage, suspect’s behavior, number
of victims, presence of weapons, suspect’s prior convictions, age of victims, presence of
illegal drugs, and use of illegal drugs.147

147

One in 20 (4.43%) of respondents (24) said that they needed to know the suspect’s race
prior to making a charging decision. When respondents selected this, we asked them to “Please
explain why you consider the suspect’s race when making a charging decision.” There were three
reasons respondents listed for needing the suspect’s race
First, prosecutors (13) indicated that they needed this information to determine whether there
was a potential hate crime. One junior Midwest prosecutor wrote, “If the suspect’s race is different
from the victim’s I would evaluate whether there was any element of it being some type of hate
crime.” A head prosecutor with over 20 years of experience in the West North Central region noted
“Because depending on the crime committed, the motive of the crime and/or the race, gender,
sexuality, religious affiliation, ethnicity of the victim, the offender can be charged with committing
a Hate Crime under [state] Law. If there is no evidence of a hate crime then the suspect’s race is
completely immaterial and never considered in any way shape or form.”
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We also provided space for respondents to write up to four additional pieces of
information relevant to their decision making. The most common piece of information
needed was input or information from the victim (36 respondents) followed by input or
information from witnesses (30).148 Other respondents (19) reported that the information
they need is case specific. Fifteen respondents reported that they needed facts of the case,
and 14 need more information about the evidence (e.g., strength, quality). Twelve
respondents wrote that they need information about the suspect’s mental health and
psychiatric history, 11 need demographic information to determine whether there is a hate
crime or domestic violence, 11 need information on the relationship between the suspect
and victim, 10 need any known substance use/drug testing results, and nine need the
suspect’s criminal history and domestic violence history. Eight report needing the suspect’s
personal information (e.g., job, address, socioeconomic status, veteran status, etc.).149
Second, prosecutors (12) indicated that this information is standard biographical and
identifying information. As one experienced prosecutor in the Pacific region noted, “We’re required
to input demographic information for identity purposes. That is the only reason.” An experienced
prosecutor in the South Atlantic region commented that “we don’t consider it in making charging
decisions, but we do mandate that the screening attorney note it in our case management system.”
Other respondents noted that knowing the suspect’s race served multiple purposes. A Midwest
prosecutor with 25 years of experience wrote that “It’s a required field for reporting purposes;
otherwise, it’s of no consequence in most cases; the sole exception would be for a charge of ethnic
intimidation (where the race of both the suspect and the victim would be noted).” An experienced
prosecutor in the Pacific region commented that “We must consider everything. Race can be relevant
in certain cases—identification and racially motivated crimes are obvious examples.”
Third, prosecutors (2) reported needing to know the suspect’s race because of the potential for
police misconduct. One midcareer prosecutor in the South Atlantic region noted, “There are racial
inequities and I have dismissed cases because the only “suspicious behavior'” has been the race of
the person (i.e. a Hispanic male walking across a park. he is stopped and searched. He has marijuana
on him) I dismiss cases where the reason for the investigation is racially motivated. Also, law
enforcement is more likely to arrest a child of color than a white child. I am cognizant of these
aspects when evaluating the response of the adults as well as the children.”
148
A total of 96 respondents indicated that they would consider the victim’s input, which
includes the 36 who supplied this information as part of this question. And another 60 respondents
noted victim’s input when explaining their decision making for the case vignette or how their office
makes decisions.
149
Seven report needing audio or video recordings of the incident, 911 call audio, or news
media reports. Seven report needing to know the defendant’s statement, intent, or justification. Six
need to know about the victim or witness reliability and criminal history. Six need information on
the search and seizure, Miranda issues, police behavior, and investigation efforts. Three report
needing information about mitigating/aggravating factors. Three report needing information about
pending/current charges and whether the defendant is on probation. Three need medical records and
reports, and three need information about the cost of damage/theft. Two need probable cause
information, two need confidential informant status, and two need a risk assessment (i.e., risk to the
community). Each of the following pieces of information was listed by one respondent: name
of/information about suspect’s girlfriend, suspect’s status in the sex offender registry, “beyond a
reasonable doubt,” whether minors were present, whether there is corroboration, whether the
defendant is cooperating with law enforcement, whether there are accomplices/suspect’s degree of
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In sum, the most important information the vast majority (75%) of respondents wanted
included the severity of injury/damage/weapons used, suspect’s behavior, number and age
of victims, prior criminal history and presence/use of drugs.

Figure 7. Information Needed to Make Charging
Decision
Severity of Personal Injuries
Use of Weapons
Severity of Property Damage
Suspect's Behavior
Number of Victims
Presence of Weapons
Suspect's Prior Convictions
Age of Victims
Presence of Illegal Drugs
Use of Illegal Drugs
Date and Time of Incident
Suspect's Prior Arrests
Suspect's Name
Address of Incident
Suspect's Age
Names of Police Officers
Gender of Victims
Home Addresses of Victims
Suspect's Gender
Suspect's Home Address
Race of Victims
Preferences or Priority of Supervising Attorney
Suspect's Job
Suspect's Education
Rank of Police Officers
Suspect's Race
Name of Suspect's Attorney
Jobs of Victims
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IV. DISCUSSION
This section considers our results in light of questions of interest about prosecutorial
discretion and its effects—variability and severity of charging, the relevance of internal
and national guidance on prosecutorial discretion, and factors considered by prosecutors in
making a decision.
participation in the crime, whether there is insurance coverage, and “reasonable likelihood of
success at trial.”
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A. Severity and Variability
To understand disparities in criminal justice outcomes, it is key to understand whether
and how prosecutors’ decisions are driving those outcomes. This study’s vignette design
solves one of the key problems with observational research—omitted variable bias. In
particular, this study held constant every aspect of the criminal behavior and police
conduct, including geographic differences and differences in conduct and background.
Prosecutorial discretion exists for a reason: each case is distinctive, and requires
individualized attention. Yet, prior social science work may fail to detect subtle variations
in case factors, which the study’s method holds constant. By holding all those other factors
constant, we can observe prosecutorial discretion itself.
We found remarkable severity in penalties imposed by some prosecutors. Recall that
$500 was the most common fine imposed for this situation, where no victim was injured
and no property was damaged. Broad surveys of the U.S. population show that six out of
ten Americans do not have $500 in savings, which suggests that this fine amount may be
onerous.150 It would certainly be an amount an average fast food worker (the occupation
of the hypothetical defendant in some of our vignettes) would be unlikely to pay, leading
to other serious criminal justice implications for an arguably minor offense. These serious
criminal charges can have devastating effects on an individual’s life.
Even more, recall that almost 30% of prosecutors recommended jail time for an
individual with no criminal record and who seems to need short-term therapy or a coolingdown period. The modal response was 30 days in jail, which would likely result in this
individual losing his job, and likely stable housing and family life (a very small number of
prosecutors did note a willingness to allow confinement to be on weekends, however). This
is a compelling finding that a sample of prosecutors would recommend such a long jail
term for an individual who has certainly made a mistake, but has not caused any physical
harm or property damage, and does not have the risk factors of being dangerous. Even aside
from the effects on defendants and their families, such incarceration also imposes onerous
financial costs on the government—amounting to $45,000 per year in some jurisdictions.151

150

Robertson et al., supra note 117.
See, e.g., Annual Determination of Average Cost of Incarceration Fee, 84 Fed. Reg. 63,891,
63,891–92 (Nov. 19, 2019) (“Based on [Fiscal Year] 2018 data, [Fiscal Year] 2018 [Cost of
Incarceration Fee] was $37,449.00 ($102.60 per day) for Federal inmates in Bureau facilities.”);
Legislative Analyst's Office, How much does it cost to incarcerate an inmate?: California’s Annual
Costs to Incarcerate an Inmate in Prison, CAL. LEGIS.’S NONPARTISAN FISCAL AND POL’Y ADVISOR,
https://lao.ca.gov/PolicyAreas/CJ/6_cj_inmatecost (Jan. 2019) (“It costs an average of about
$81,000 per year to incarcerate an inmate in prison in California.”); Nicole Lewis & Beatrix
Lockwood, The Hidden Cost of Incarceration, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 17, 2019),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/12/17/the-hidden-cost-ofincarceration#:~:text=The%20Bureau%20of%20Justice%20Statistics,2.3%20million%20people%
20behind%20bars (“The Bureau of Justice Statistics reckons that the United States spends more
than $80 billion each year to keep roughly 2.3 million people behind bars.”).
151
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Some of this severity may be due to plea bargaining strategies. Recall that many
respondents were unwilling to impose punishment given the lack of harm to people or
property and in light of the offender’s perceived mental health issues. But several
respondents noted in their qualitative comments that they would bring multiple charges or
more severe charges in order to induce the defendant to plea guilty to fewer or less severe
charges or to accept mental health or substance abuse treatment.152 Some respondents
reported opposition to overcharging, however, and reported only bringing charges they felt
they could prove. Future research should systematically study variation in prosecutors’
views on plea bargaining strategies.
Aside from the severity of sentences, the variability is also striking. The Supreme
Court has reiterated that the Constitution “requires that all persons subjected to . . .
legislation shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both in the
privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed.”153 Prosecutors nationally charged
similarly situated defendants who allegedly committed the same crime to varying terms of
two years of prison time, six months of jail time, down to thirty days of jail time or
community service. Similarly, some prosecutors charged defendants hefty fines of up to
$5,000 dollars and others $500 or much lesser amounts of $250. All of this demonstrates
that prosecutorial discretion is indeed broad, largely unsupervised, and highly variable and
inconsistent. This is an important finding for those studying prosecutors to consider as far
as potential interventions.
Most of this variation was inexplicable. We did however observe some correlations
that merit further study. Prosecutors in some regions of the country appear to be harsher
than others—specifically prosecutors in the West South Central and the Mountain regions.
Further exploration into the causes of variability are required.
B. Guidelines and Standards
This wide variability in prosecutor decisions is consistent with a lack of meaningful
supervision or guidance within prosecutor charging. Prosecutors’ offices have been called
“black boxes” for the lack of transparency about how charging decisions are made, but our
study sheds light.154 Our data show the general unimportance of supervisors and office
guidelines to prosecutors making charging decisions. In our survey, nearly three-quarters
of prosecutors reported that they decided alone; their supervisors provided no direction into
the initial charging decisions. Although somewhat more than half of respondents said they
typically relied on mandatory or precatory guidelines, nearly half indicated that they had
no such direction. For those respondents who did have direction, their guidelines often
afforded them significant discretion to deviate or were only an internal office standard such
as “do justice.” And although some prosecutors reported having charging manuals or grids,
many prosecutors reported that guidelines or standards were not in writing. And some
152

The outcome for prosecutors who overcharge may thus be similar to the outcome of
prosecutors who initially recommend no punishment.
153
Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 72–73 (1887).
154
See, e.g., Miller & Wright, supra note 6.
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noted that their guidelines and standards were “proprietary,” which raises questions about
transparency. These findings suggest avenues for reform, both within prosecutors’ offices
and beyond.
A first step may be to simply require prosecutors to note their reasons for making
discretionary decisions.155 Richard Frase argued that this approach can be successful as
“reasons evolve into factors, and factors evolve into rules.”156 Frase goes on to explain that
“the use of written reasons for prosecution decisions, which are routinely reviewed by
supervising attorneys, seems the minimum requirement for effective control of prosecution
decisions.”157 Judge Stephanos Bibas has also claimed that “[s]imply having to explain and
justify one’s decisions disciplines prosecutors, much as writing reasoned decisions
disciplines judges.”158 Prosecutors offices might consider requiring prosecutors to
articulate the reasons for the charges they impose, with internal quarterly or bi-annual
review of decisions to determine whether they match the objectives of the office.
Overall, our data demonstrate—as theorized—that individual prosecutors have the
utmost discretion to charge defendants as they see fit. We see stark severity in sanctioning
some defendants, but this study also demonstrates that for the same crime, defendants
receive largely varying and harsh or lenient sentences, depending on the prosecutor they
interact with. Structural changes must be made if more consistency and decreased severity
are desired in prosecutorial charging.159
C. Factors Relevant to Decision Making
Our study also highlights factors relevant to prosecutor decision making. When
presented with a list of factors important to make a charging decision, respondents
unsurprisingly reported needing to know about the harm to persons and property, the
number and age of victims, the criminal history of the offender, and the presence and use
of weapons. Several also reported needing the victim’s input and information from
witnesses, a finding that was also present in their responses to the vignette. Knowing
whether the offender had mental health or substance abuse issues was also important to
many prosecutors, although this was clearer in their responses to the vignette than in
response to the survey question. It was unclear whether knowing about drug use was
important in charging for purposes of greater leninency, more severe charges, or for
diversionary purposes. Finally, while very few reported needing to know about the
offender’s education or job to make a charging decision, the qualitative responses to the
vignette demonstrate that many prosecutors do consider the socioeconomic status of the
155

Frase, supra note 128, at 292–96.
Id. at 294.
157
Id. at 294.
158
Bibas, supra note 14, at 1006.
159
See Barkow, supra note 4 (manuscript at 21) (“We need structural changes to do more than
chip away at the edge of mass incarceration.”); see also Baughman, supra note 13, at 1139 (“Rather
than trying to address the individual failing branches, . . . instituting subconstitutional checksstopgaps adopted by the three branches of government to effectuate the rights in the Constitution
when the system is stalled in dysfunction could create meaningful change.”).
156
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offender when deciding whether a fine or a term of confinement is important. It is important
to acknowledge that while prosecutors claim that these factors are the most important, it is
unclear that that is the case. Prosecutors could be making subconsious decisions based on
factors in our vignette that they are unaware influenced them.160 However, having a list of
factors important to the majority of prosecutors provides an important insight into the black
box of prosecutor discretion. We hope it will spark future research on the factors considered
by prosecutors in charging decisions.
D. Limitations
As with any empirical study, our study has several limitations. First, while our study
is national in scope, it is not representative. That is, we recruited respondents from every
region in the United States, but the sample does not represent prosecutors in the U.S. For
example, we have an overrepresentation of prosecutors in the Mountain region in our study
(likely because two of the three authors were professors at universities in the Mountain
region at the time the study was conducted). We also had a relatively low response rate of
12%, and there may be significant differences between respondents and nonrespondents in
how they make decisions and use discretion. Moreover, respondents were not required to
answer all of the survey questions or write in responses when prompted. Thus, there may
be differences within the sample between respondents who offered additional information
and respondents who did not.
Additionally, we designed the study to be short, including just a few questions. The
primary objective of the study was to test the effects of race and class on prosecutor
decision making in a vignette-based experiment,161 and a few survey questions were added
to obtain more information about prosecutor decision making generally. The responses to
the open-ended questions offered an opportunity to acquire further insight into prosecutor
decision making, but cannot provide the rich data that a semi-structured interview with
prosecutors would. With respect to the qualitative analysis, however, our sample size is
very large, and so while there is not the depth of typical qualitative studies, there is
significant breadth. We were thus able to quantify some of the qualitative data.
It is likely, however, that our study underestimates the importance of some of the
themes we identified in the qualitative analysis. For example, we only asked respondents
to recommend a monetary penalty or term of confinement and did not ask them about
whether they would recommend mental health treatment. While many respondents brought
up mental health concerns, it is likely that more prosecutors would recommend treatment
if we had explicitly asked them to reflect on this.
Furthermore, we only provided one hypothetical crime to prosecutors, and it was
relatively minor. Prosecutors see a wide range of criminal activity, including severe
criminal activity, and so the results about the vignette may not be applicable to other types
of crime. Future research may want to present prosecutors with multiple different crimes.

160
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In brief, our study should be understood as exploratory. The results presented in this
Article can give rise to hypotheses to be tested in future quantitative studies or to develop
questions to be used in in-depth qualitative interviews.
CONCLUSION
Much remains unknown about how prosecutors make decisions. Our national study
was designed to illuminate the role of discretion in prosecutor decision making as well as
the effects of such discretion. Our study best tracks what prosecutors wish they could
charge defendants with when resource constraints are removed, which provides insight into
the mind of prosecutors practicing in various jurisdictions across the country. As seen from
the responses to the vignette we provided, different prosecutors evaluating the same case
recommend vastly different charges and punitive sanctions. Additionally, we described a
relatively minor crime, but a subset of respondents recommended harsh sanctions. This
may be due, in part, to the absence of internal or national guidelines prosecutors report
needing to follow. The findings from our exploratory study provide a starting point for
future research assessing the variability and severity of prosecutors’ decisions, as well as
the role of standards and guidelines in constraining discretion.
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